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Abstract 
 
One of the challenges in microfinance is to solve asymmetric information and cost 
concerns related to serving poor customers with little or no collateral, in order to offer 
poor people and small businesses access to financial services. In resent times the 
industry has been critiqued for maintaining harsh collection practices and charging too 
high interest rates to their clients. The microfinance mission of serving the poor has 
been questioned from several holds. There are sufficient previous studies that show 
that the interest rate to a great extent is driven by the operating costs in the institutions. 
Identifying the drivers of the operating costs thus becomes necessary in order to lower 
interest rates offered to the customers. The critique on collection practices is not 
uncalled for. Frequent collection of repayment is in the microfinance industry 
generally viewed as an essential component in reducing the risk of default, which 
historically has been a prominent goal of microfinance institutions due to the lack of 
collateral offered by their clients. The lack of credit history further adds to the need to 
manage risk, but with little background information allocation of resources becomes 
problematic. Transaction costs are therefore high in the industry.  
 
It is a paradox that the world’s poorest are charged with the highest cost of capital, and 
the industry faces a need for lower interest rates in order to help more people. This 
study investigates the relationship between default rates and operating costs in the 
microfinance sector, and looks into whether the microfinance sector over time has 
been too concerned with lowering default rates. Has the focus on default rates left the 
microfinance institutions with too high operating costs due to extensive transaction 
costs connected to monitoring, control and collection practices? Would they be better 
off by allowing for higher levels of default and lower transaction costs? 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the background for the study of the relationship between the 
default loans rates and the operating costs rate in microfinance institutions. It provides 
a statement of the research problem, the research objective and the research question, 
as well as the contribution and organisation of the study.  
 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
Microfinance institutions are organisations that offer banking services to poor people 
who are economically active and with a need to loan small amounts to finance for 
example a business idea or education, or to manage emergencies, obtain assets or 
smooth consumption (Christen, Lyman & Rosenberg, 2002). These clients often lack 
credit histories and/or collateral, and therefore experience difficulties accessing 
financing from ordinary commercial banks (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). Microfinance 
institutions are therefore often viewed as contributors in creating economic 
opportunities and poverty alleviation (Di Bella, 2011). 
 
Existing literature on microfinance institutions’ operating costs rate focus on, amongst 
others, the type of ownership (see Mersland & Strøm, 2008; Mersland, 2009), 
characteristics of the microfinance institutions (see Gonzales, 2007) and whether or 
not the institutions are receiving subsidies (see Caudill, Gropper & Hartarska, 2009). 
To my knowledge, there are no published empirical studies related to the relationship 
between the level of default on loans and the operating costs rate of the institutions. 
This study offers to close the gap by examining the nature of this relationship and the 
direction of its effects.  
 
 
1.2 Statement of the research problem 
Microfinance institutions serve a social mission of outreach. By offering small loans 
they are able to extend credit to more people, including those who are only able to 
repay very small amounts, i.e. the poor people. Because microfinance customers often 
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offer little or no collateral, the risk inferred is generally higher than for mainstream 
commercial banks. Over time, this has brought with it a need to lower risk by spending 
great resources on reducing the level of default on loans. This thesis is based on the 
idea that as high levels of default evidently will lead to increased costs, very low levels 
may similarly increase the operating costs, as the manpower demanded to maintain 
these levels is costly. As will be argued in later chapters, high operating costs are 
assumed to affect the interest rate levels offered to customers. The mission to help the 
poor in establishing businesses or smooth consumption can more easily be fulfilled if 
the interest rates offered to them are more affordable. Therefore, an efficiency analysis 
focused on the effect of the default rate on operating costs is timely and important.  
 
 
1.3 Research objective 
The research objective of this thesis is to study the relationship between the default on 
loans rate and operating costs rate in microfinance institutions.  
 
 
1.4 Research question 
What is the relationship between the default on loans rate and operating costs rate in 
microfinance institutions? 
 
 
1.5 Contribution of the study 
Building on contract theory, principle-agent and moral hazard theory, theory on credit 
risk and Berger & De Young’s (1997) research on the relationship between problem 
loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks, this study aims to provide a better 
understanding of this relationship in microfinance institutions. It uses multivariate 
analysis with instrumental variables to control for the direction of the relationship and 
to produce a graphic illustration of it. The study adds to existing literature within 
microfinance by suggesting that adjusting the default on loans rate in either direction 
could potentially alter the cost efficiency in the industry.    
  10 
1.6 Organisation of the study 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following the introduction, which reviews 
the background of the study and the research objective, the second chapter focuses on 
the microfinance industry and deliberate on the motivation for the study. Theories and 
past research is presented in chapter three, along with the outline of the conceptual 
framework and hypothesis. Chapter four is concerned with the data and offers 
information about the sample and an outline of the variables. Following the fourth 
chapter, the research methodology is discussed in chapter five, and the empirical 
findings and results in chapter six. Chapter seven rounds up the study by presenting 
the main conclusions and suggestions for further research.  
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2. The microfinance industry 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the history and development of microfinance, the 
mission of microfinance, and the drivers of the microfinance lending rate.  
 
 
2.1 Microfinance history and development 
Microfinance is by Helms (2006) defined as the supply of banking services to poor 
families and micro enterprises. Microfinance institutions usually offer small loans of 
short duration without formal collateral, often set up as group loans for which the 
group members are jointly liable for repayment. The concept was developed in the 
1970s and 1980s (Mersland & Strøm, 2012a) as a reaction to the discouraged 
development resulting from subsidized rural credit in the two prior decades (Adams & 
Finchett, 1992). The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by international donors and 
national governments investing vast amounts in low-cost credit to farmers, ultimately 
resulting in intensification of corruption and high default rates (Hulme and Mosely 
1996).  
 
The innovation that came with microfinance in the 1970s and 1980s focused on 
aligning poor people’s demand for financial services with the requirement of 
repayment to the banks. The contemporary way of organising the lending agreement 
had its roots in informal financial systems, like that of rotating savings and credit 
associations (Adams and Fitchett, 1992), where poor people come together to organize 
small credit schemes and savings clubs. Banks ensured repayment by issuing only 
small loans of short duration, and would back these up with informal or group 
collateral (Mersland & Strøm, 2012a). Further, in contrast to the practise in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the microfinance institutions would assess the payment capacity of the 
customers based on their current sources of income rather than on anticipated income 
from new business.  
 
The start of the microfinance era is by many people associated with Bangladeshi 
Mohammad Yunus, who in 1976 began issuing small private loans to women after a 
visit to the poorest parts of the village Jobra, in India (Yunus & Jolis, 1999). He 
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noticed that very small loans would allow for disproportionate changes and 
opportunities to these people, and was motivated to build on the possibility to make a 
difference (Yunus & Jolis, 1999). Yunus later developed a relationship with the 
governmentally regulated Janata Bank to secure loans to the people of Jobra. Soon 
after, in the early 1980s, the Grameen Bank was established with the sole purpose of 
providing financial service to the poor people in the village (Yunus & Jolis, 1999). 
This is perhaps the best-known microfinance institution from the early years. Despite 
being the best-known, it was not the first. Opportunity International, one of today’s the 
biggest international microfinance networks, roots back to 1971 when pioneer David 
Bussau and Al Wittaker started issuing small loans to engender work for the poor 
people in the area (Opportunity International, 2016). 
 
Until the early 1990s microfinance initiatives were for the most part driven by donor-
funded non-government organisations providing credit to entrepreneurial poor people 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2012a). However, as the years went on, operations developed to 
include all types of financial services. Today saving, insurance and systems for money 
transfer are common services offered by the microfinance institutions, and they are 
becoming available for the poor all over the world (Christen, Rosenberg & Jayadeva, 
2004). The microfinance industry has in the recent decades seen a remarkable 
development, with microfinance institutions as the providers of the microfinance 
services. (Mersland & Strøm, 2013) report that the growth in the total loan portfolio of 
the microfinance institutions has been positive for the past two decades, and that the 
growth has averaged between 40% and 60% for several years. Also the growth rate in 
individual microfinance institutions has been strong, averaging over 20% annually for 
several years.  
 
However, in the past ten years the maturation of the microfinance industry has brought 
with it claims that the industry is deserting the mission to serve the poor (Dichter & 
Harper, 2007). The media coverage concerning microfinance shifted rather rapidly 
from being praising and rosy in 2005 and 2006 to rather critical and grim in 2007. In 
2005 the United Nations declared the year as the Year of Microcredit (United Nations, 
2016), with Secretary-General Kofi Annan stating that: “microfinance has proved its 
value, in many countries, as a weapon against poverty and hunger. It really can change 
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peoples’ lives for the better, especially the lives of those who need it most" (United 
Nations, 2016). The glory continued into 2006 when microfinance pioneer 
Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (Nobel 
Media, 2016). In 2007, however, the focus shifted to cover the Banco Compartamos 
case in Mexico, where the sale of overpriced loans received much criticism and 
changed the way the public viewed the industry (Rosenberg, 2007). Later, the tragic 
case of suicides in Andhra Pradesh continued to attract public attention and provoke 
scepticism about the microfinance concept (Ryhne, 2011). The case refers to several 
borrowers who committed suicide because they were unable to repay debt to 
microfinance institutions and local moneylenders (Business Insider, 2012, 24.2.). In 
the aftermath, accusations that microfinance institutions are overcharging interest, 
have drifted from their mission statement to help the poor, and are too hard-handed in 
collecting repayments on loans started to flourish. As a result, attention is now given 
to limit the size of the lending rate (Mersland & Strøm, 2012b). 
 
Regardless of the concerns and scepticism, the growth in the industry has persisted in 
the following years. Mersland & Strøm (2012a) show that even in 2008, the year of 
the financial crisis, the growth was positive, though less than in previous and 
preceding years. Furthermore, their research indicate that a consolidation is under way 
in the industry, and that the average loan portfolio among the microfinance institutions 
were in 2009 over twice the size of that in 2007.  Such consolidation illustrates that the 
amount lent to poor customers improve even when the number of institutions 
decreases. Naturally, this tremendous growth cannot take place unless it is 
advantageous for borrowers to undertake the loans, and Mersland & Strøm (2013) 
argue that the high levels of growth are evidence of the lending rate being acceptable.  
 
 
2.2 Microfinance mission 
A common trait in microfinance is the ability to solve asymmetric information and 
cost concerns related to serving poor customers with little or no collateral (Karlan & 
Zinman, 2009), thus giving unfortunate people and small businesses access to 
financial services. It targets poor people and small businesses in developing countries, 
and the microfinance institutions often further specify their target markets to people in 
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semi-urban and rural districts and women (Mersland & Strøm, 2012a). Since its 
emergence, microfinance has kept entrepreneurial poor people as its main target, and 
has received criticism (see e.g. Helms, 2006) for thus failing to reach people with little 
or no entrepreneurial activities, who often are also the poorest people. However, the 
strong and persistent growth in the industry must arguably reflect a response to an 
underlying demand, and is thus an indication of microfinance having positive impact. 
 
Providers of microfinance typically have both financial and social objectives 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010), that is, they have a double objective to provide 
financial services to the poor and to do so in a financially sustainable way. The idea of 
microfinance is to bring basic utility of finance to poor people (Green, Kirkpatrick & 
Murinde 2005), by providing people with the chance to smooth consumption and store 
savings. In this prospect, microfinance could be seen chance to extend financial 
services to people who previously have not had such opportunities. By removing the 
frictions that prevent poorer segments from access to financial services, Mersland and 
Strøm (2012a) suggest that the development of the county’s financial system could 
improve. Morduch (1999) claims that access to microfinance while paying for the 
services can be seen as a tool to reduce poverty, while Levine (2005) shows that 
financial development has an influential effect on economic growth as well as income 
inequality. Recently, however, it has been questioned whether the endowment of small 
loans is the best solution to help poor people out of poverty. Further criticism has been 
raised on the high level of interest rates in the industry, with arguments that 
microfinance institutions only operates to earn money and are too attentive when it 
comes to obtaining repayments on loans (Mersland & Strøm, 2012b). The social 
objective of microfinance institutions fosters a need for lower interest rates by the 
simple justification that lower rates will make the loans more affordable and thus more 
available to the customers, serving the social objective of helping more people.  
 
 
2.3 The drivers of the microfinance lending rate 
In the light of the negative attention attracted to the industry in connection with the 
Banco Compartamos and Andhra Pradesh case accusations that microfinance 
institutions are overcharging interest started to flourish. As a result, attention is now 
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given to limit the size of the lending rate (Mersland & Strøm, 2012b). Bhatt (2001) 
points out that microfinance institutions in many cases have experienced problems 
with high default rates. Defaults are bad for the industry not just because of the losses 
the microfinance institutions incur, but also of political and social concerns 
(Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013). Inability to meet financial obligations has proven to be a 
trigger for serious social effects such as riots, deterioration of community relationships 
and even suicide and death (Hulme, 2000; Montgomery, 1996). Chakrabarty & Bass 
(2013) find that this is especially observable in emerging markets, where political, 
social and economic risks are high in general, leaving doing business more difficult. 
Because these markets are more risky to operate in, microfinance institutions make an 
extra effort to try limit the risk they undertake. Field & Pande (2008) states that 
frequent collection of repayment installments is commonly believed to be one of the 
most important components in reducing the risk of default. Thus, great resources are 
often spent in the collection and monitoring process, and the transaction costs of the 
microfinance institutions are thereby driven up (Field & Pande, 2008).  In order for 
microfinance institutions to be financially sustainable the high operating costs are 
further passed on to borrowers in terms of high interest rates ((Dehejia, Montgomery, 
& Morduch, 2012; Fernando, 2006; Morduch, 2000). Additionally, in emerging 
markets, which often are those that microfinance institutions operate in, inefficient 
litigation in dysfunctional courts are common, making contracts difficult to enforce. 
As such, it can be argued that borrowers will not worry about breaching contracts 
(Field & Pande, 2008). Thus, loan defaults pose potentially great risks for 
microfinance institutions.   
 
Rosenberg, Gaul, Ford & Tomilova (2013) maintain that the interest rates are often 
much higher in the microfinance industry compared to regular banks, primarily 
because it is much more expensive to lend and collect on many small loans relative to 
fewer and larger loans. They too enlighten that the costs have to be covered through 
the interest rates charged to the customers. Furthermore, Rosenberg, Gonzalez & 
Narain (2009) reveals that the operating costs in microfinance institutions justify more 
than 50% of these rates.  Gonzalez (2007) declare microfinance a high touch, high cost 
industry, and assert that identifying the drivers of the operating costs are necessary in 
order to lower interest rates offered to the customers. A lowering of the interest rate 
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could in turn help microfinance institutions better reach their social mission of 
outreach to the poor. It is a paradox that the world’s poorest are charged with the 
highest cost of capital. Offering small loans at affordable costs becomes one of the 
core challenges of the industry.  
 
The motivation for investigating the operating costs in microfinance institutions thus 
rest on findings that the high interest rates in the industry are mainly caused by the 
operating costs of the banks (Gonzalez, 2010; Mersland & Strøm, 2012b; Rosenberg et 
al.,2013). Mersland & Strøm (2012b) find that for most microfinance institutions 
modifications in lending rates, revenue and profitability are products of increased 
input prices. They further hold that high costs and low margins is the industry’s main 
problem. That statement is supported in Mersland & Strøm (2013), which finds that 
contrary to being an industry with high profits, it struggles with high costs and low 
earnings. This is maintained in our data set, where we see that the average portfolio 
yield is close to 38%, whereas the operating costs of portfolio is above 30% (see 
chapter 4.1). In addition to operating costs, the cost of funds and the loan loss have to 
be covered before profits can be distributed. Mersland & Strøm (2012b) report similar 
numbers and concludes that the average profitability in the microfinance sector is low 
and that return on assets often comes close to zero. Chapter 4.1 of this thesis will 
display similar findings in our dataset. 
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3. Theories and past research 
 
This chapter discusses the empirical evidence from past research on default on loans, 
operating costs and social outreach in microfinance institutions, and presents existing 
literature on the relationship between cost efficiency and problem loans. 
It will look into the nature of this relationship in search for an enhanced understanding 
of the influence of the loan default rate on the microfinance operating costs, and 
ultimately, the lending rate.  
 
Further chapters will continue into investigating whether there might be a general 
functional form for this relationship that can further be used in search for an optimal 
level of default. Literature is drawn from microfinance and economical/financial 
studies and theory. The basis of the research question builds upon contract theory, 
agency theory and theories on moral hazard and credit risk, as well as the findings of 
Berger & De Young (1997) of reversed causality between problem loans and costs in 
banks. Although the Berger and De Young base their research on commercial banks, 
this paper will argue that the findings are likely to be similar when looked at from 
microfinance perspective. Most microfinance research is found in development 
journals, but in the later years we see more and more articles published in economic 
and financial journals as well. Yet the research available in mainstream financial 
journals is still limited. The chapter will be rounded of by an overview of the 
conceptual framework and a presentation of the hypothesis.  
 
 
3.1 Theoretical background  
 
3.1.1 Contract theory 
Contract theory examines how contractual measures and agreements can be composed 
in the presence of asymmetric information, and is concerned with theories of 
incentives, information and economic institutions (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005). The 
concept is widely discussed in microeconomics (see e.g. Hart & Holmström, 1987; 
Tirole, 1988; Maskin & Tirole, 1992; Dewatripont & Maskin, 1995; Crémer, Khalil & 
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Rochet, 1998; Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005; Köszegi, 2014), and while the literature 
covers several viewpoints and aspects of contract theory, it is common to use 
numerical utility structures to present the behaviour of decision-makers before 
implementing an algorithm for optimization. Contract theory discuss, amongst other, 
theoretical ways to deal with principle-agent issues such as moral hazard, adverse 
selection and signalling through the use of mathematical characteristics of the utility 
structure between the principal and the agent. In summary, contract theory is 
concerned with the economic analysis of contracts.  
 
3.1.2 Agency theory 
Agency theory has its roots in risk sharing literature, which is concerned with 
cooperating parties who have different attitudes towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989), but 
expands to include different goals and labour division between the parties (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). More specifically, agency theory is concerned with solving the 
principal-agent challenges that can occur when tasks or responsibilities are delegated 
by one party (the principal) to another (the agent). Consequently, principal-agent 
problems typically occur in situations where both parties are utility maximizing, i.e. 
when the agent is concerned with maximizing his own utility, even when it might be 
on the expense of that of the principal (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Meckling & Jensen 
(1976) describe how agency theory depicts this relationship by using the metaphor of a 
contract. Building on the economic concepts of game theory and rational choice 
theory, agency theory focuses on how to create efficient contracts to govern the 
principal-agent relationship, given the available information (often limited and/or 
asymmetric) and goals, attitudes and incentives of the parties (MacNeil, 2000; 
Bromiley, 2005). Principal-agent theory is often exemplified using shareholder-
manager relationships, but can be attributed to any situation where one party acts on 
behalf of another. 
 
Bruce, Buck & Main (2005) argue that agency theory is based on the assumption that 
agents are self-interested and utility maximizing, which in many relationships may not 
be the case. Critics further contend that constraints external to the principle-agent 
relationship may limit the opportunistic behaviours of the agent or interrupt the 
systems used in monitoring and controlling agent behaviour (see e.g. Fligstein & 
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Freeland, 1995; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Bruce et al., 2005). Wiseman, Cuevas-
Rodríguez & Gomez-Mejia (2012) assert that such constraints are specific to the 
institutional environment of a firm. The microfinance industry in this context, stand 
out from commercial banking in their innovative methods of social monitoring via 
group lending arrangements. The idea is that the environment in which the 
microfinance clients find them self will not allow for opportunistic behaviour by the 
borrower (i.e. behaviour that is not aligned with the agreements made with the lender, 
such as not meeting their obligations or withholding information about the success of 
operations), as the group members are jointly reliable for repayment of the loans. 
Thus, microfinance institutions rely on the agents (i.e. the microfinance customers) to 
use social pressure to avoid defaults that negatively affect the whole group.  
Nevertheless, there exists extensive literature supporting the central idea of agency 
theory; agents left unmonitored are likely to pursue private interests that deviate and 
even conflict with the goals of the principal (see e.g. Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-
Mejia, 2000; Westphal & Khanna, 2003; Harris & Bromiley, 2007). One could argue 
that this sort of behaviour is even more likely in the microfinance industry, as the 
clients often are poor and desperate. Additionally, the loans are regularly given with 
little or no collateral and with little information about the borrower and his/her credit 
history. It is reasonable to envision that without a certain degree of monitoring (formal 
or informal), and because credit history is poorly documented in the industry, 
microfinance customers could fairly easily abandon their agreement with the 
microfinance institution and walk out on their obligations in terms of repayment. It 
becomes apparent that microfinance institutions are prone to great risk, which is likely 
the main reason to why the industry over the past decades has put in such extensive 
resources in collection practice and monitoring to reduce it.  
 
3.1.3 Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is a widely discussed phenomenon within the agency theory (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992). It describes situations in which the one making decisions about risk is 
not the one responsible for the outcome (Krugman, 2009). This often occurs in 
situations where information asymmetry is present, i.e. that the decision-maker knows 
more about its actions or intentions than the party bearing the consequences of the 
risk, and when incentives varies between the two parties.   
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The term “moral hazard” was established in the 1600’s and used about immoral 
behaviour, often related to insurance relations (Dembe & Boden, 2000). Dembe & 
Boden (2000) do however explain that the term was renewed in the 1900’s and is now 
used to describe inefficiencies as a result of information asymmetry, rather than the 
morale of the involved parties. As implied by Dembe og Boden (2000), the concept of 
moral hazard has its roots in the insurance industry, which is built upon the idea of 
transferring risk to another party (Pritchard, 2016). The theory of moral hazard in that 
context is that the insurance taker will act differently knowing that he is insured than 
he would if he carried to full risk of costs himself. For example, knowing that they are 
insured, he may be less careful with his assets. The same logic can be transferred into 
the relationship between a lender and a borrower. After being granted a loan, the 
borrower may act recklessly or invest or spend money in a different way than the 
lender would prefer or that is agreed upon in their contract. In other words, principle-
agent concerns arise when incentives between the borrower and lender do not align.  
 
Existing contract-theoretic literature focus on how moral hazard evade the first-best 
solution, which is the one that would be obtained under complete information (see 
Hart & Homström, 1987; Rogerson, 1985; Schmitz, 2005). The literature discusses 
two main reasons, where the first assumes that the agent is risk-averse and the second 
assumes that the agent is risk-neutral, but wealth-constrained. In the first case the 
principle faces a trade-off between presenting the agent with incentives and insurance, 
whereas in the second case the agent (borrower) might experience problems repaying 
the principle (lender) so that there is a trade-off between the providing the agent with 
incentives and minimizing his limited-liability rent (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). In 
the microfinance industry, the institutions have to face and deal with both scenarios. 
The second case, where the agent (i.e. the microfinance client) is wealth-constraint, 
marks the foundation of the entire industry, which is centred at providing financial 
services to the poor. The microfinance institutions therefore have to constantly 
maintain a balance between offering incentives and reassurances to the borrowers, 
while exercising monitoring and control measures in order to reduce risk of default. 
Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch (2005) explain that microfinance institutions are 
exposed to moral hazard from their credit clients because they do not have sufficient 
information about the borrowers to separate good from bad risk. The solution has 
  21 
therefore in many cases been to apply the same level of effort in collection of 
repayment and control and monitoring to all customers. This of course, is very costly 
in terms of use of recourses. The moral hazard concern is in microfinance more 
apparent than in commercial banks, as microfinance customers often have little or no 
existing credit history documented (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007), which in turn set the 
basis for information asymmetry and adverse selection.    
 
3.1.4 Credit risk 
Credit risk refers to a financial institution’s likelihood of loss due to a borrower’s 
default on debt (SAS, 2016). The loss refers to, amongst others, unpaid principal and 
interest, interference with cash flows and augmented collection costs. Consequently, 
greater levels of credit risk are associated with elevated costs of lending (operating 
costs) (Simkovic, 2016). Credit risk management is the measures taken to deal with 
this risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000), and involves 
identification, measurement, monitoring and control of the risk that arise from a 
possible default (Coyle, 2000). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) 
state that effective managing of credit risk is fundamental to the long-term 
achievements of financial institutions, and that the loan portfolio constitutes the main 
component of credit risk. Measuring the credit risk is however not so straight forward, 
due to the many factors that may influence the borrowers ability to repay the lender 
(Investing Answers, 2016). Some suggested sources to credit risk in microfinance 
institutions are offered below: 
 
- Microfinance customers may struggle to generate sufficient return on 
investments due to lack of knowledge and restricted access to technical advice 
or support services. 
- Insufficient return on investment may be caused by political challenges or 
natural disasters. 
- Lack of credit history and prevalent use of informal financing in regions where 
microfinance institutions operate pose the risk that the microfinance customer 
may face liabilities towards informal lenders. These may get precedence over 
the microfinance institution due to the often-ill consequences offered by the 
informal lenders. 
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- Unexpected circumstances at the borrowers household, such as sudden illness, 
accident or death (pure risk) may interrupt business activities or lead to 
redirected attention and use of funds.  
- Microfinance customers may redirect the use of funds to non-essential 
consumption, often in connection with lacking incentives for repayment and/or 
lack of motivation in terms of generating cash flows through 
investments/entrepreneurial activities.  
 
The fundamental concepts of credit risk management have been portrayed by 
numerous authors such as Lindergren (1987), Santomero and Babbel (1997), Dowd, 
Bartlett, Chaplin, and Kelliher & O’Brien (2008) as: “(i) the establishment of a clear 
risk policy and a reporting structure; (ii) underwriting authority and loans limit; (iii) 
allocation of responsibility and accountability; (iv) prioritization of the lending process 
and systems; and (v) the timely communication of risk information to top 
management” (Afriyie & Akotey, 2013). McKinsey&Company (2016) assert that a 
well-designed credit process can reduce a business’ operating expenses by 15-20%, 
and that financial institutions must have a hands-on approach in handling possible 
losses to sustain value. SAS (2016) further maintain that the starting point to achieving 
effective credit risk management is to acquire a complete understanding of a bank’s 
overall credit risk by screening risk at the individual, customer and portfolio levels. 
This can however be challenging in microfinance institutions, as information is often 
asymmetric and credit history poorly documented (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch 
(2005); Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). While banks strive for a thorough outline of their 
risk profiles, sufficient and correct information can be hard to obtain in an 
environment characterized as “unbankable” by commercial financial institutions. 
Without a thorough risk assessment, institutions struggle to assess whether their 
capital reserves accurately reflect risks or if loan loss reserves sufficiently cover 
possible short-term credit losses (SAS, 2016). A possible way to deal with the 
restricted access to credit risk assessment is to reduce risk all together by tightening in 
on monitoring and supervision of customers. This is likely what the microfinance 
industry has experienced over the past few decades, which has resulted in very low 
levels of default in the industry (Field & Pande, 2008). Because the institutions are not 
able to make accurate assessments of the likelihood of default, resources are directed 
  23 
at collection practice and supervision of all the microfinance customers. Whereas 
commercial banks with well-established credit risk management are able to sort out 
where to allocate resources to reduce the risk of default, microfinance institutions 
struggle to make the distinction between good and bad risk. It becomes apparent that 
the microfinance industry compensate for the lacking advantages of effective credit 
risk management by appointing great resources to avoid default in “all” cases. To 
investigate whether the strong focus on default rates demonstrates the best use of 
resources is both timely and necessary. 
 
On the other hand, handling (i.e. limiting) the risk of default is important for any 
financial institution, as defaults have been shown to leave banks with fewer resources 
available to for lending to other customers, deflate staff moral and affect borrower 
confidence (Agu, 1998). Research also shows that the operational costs associated 
with loans past due tends to be extensive and reduce the profitability of the banks 
(Padmanabham, 1988; Agu, 1998). Inadequately managed risk can further result in 
stakeholders (e.g. investors, customers, lenders, donors, savers and staff) losing 
confidence in the bank, and ultimately lead to reduced access to funding (Natilson & 
Bruett, 2001). Without, or with limited access to, funding microfinance institutions 
will struggle to meet their social objective of providing financial services to the poor. 
As pointed out by several authors (see Morduch, 1999; Sebstad & Cohen, 2000; 
Levine, 2005; Green, Kirkpatrick & Murinde, 2005), access to financial services 
through appropriate delivery mechanisms can help microfinance clients reduce their 
vulnerability and improve their life quality. This provides a fundamental basis for 
reducing poverty as well as strengthening the sustainability of the microfinance 
institution.  
 
3.1.5 Cost efficiency 
Berger & De Young (1997) is widely known and well credited for their studies on the 
relationship between problem loans and cost efficiency in banking institutions. Their 
main findings show that banks incur additional costs from loans that do not perform or 
default because they force the bank to spend extra resources on monitoring and 
underwriting to influence loan quality. They do however argue that whether or not the 
default on loans rate can be included as part of operating costs depends on the nature 
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of the relationship between these two measurements. Their research then investigates 
this relationship by examining several of the banks’ policies and underlying concerns, 
such as the cause of defaults and bank failures and the supervisory focus of bank 
managers. Their main argument is that when loans become non-accruing managerial 
effort is commonly upscaled to deal with these predicaments, thus leading to 
increasing expenses generally recognized as operating costs. These include, but are not 
limited to costs associated with monitoring borrowers and the value of their collateral, 
analysing and negotiating new repayment plans, acting on their right to collect (and 
dispose of) collateral, effort to maintain bank status and reputation, effort to avoid 
issues with loans that are currently performing, and shifts in management focus to 
problem loans on the expense of other tasks (Berger & De Young, 1997). Apart from 
collecting, maintaining and disposing of collateral, microfinance institutions face most 
of the same costs associated with problem loans and defaults, as their operations in 
that regard to a great extent is organized similarly to regular banks. One could even 
argue that the costs in the microfinance industry is even greater, do to lack of formal 
channels in which contracts can be enforced.  
 
The findings in Berger & De Young (1997) support their expectation of a positive 
relationship between loans that are past due and operating costs, but the study shows 
that the effects are typically very small (approximately 1.7% decrease in cost 
efficiency as a consequence of a 1% increase in non-performing loans). They do 
however point out individual differences between banks and argue that the effects may 
be greater when the changes are larger (non-linear relationship). On the other hand, 
their study also show that bad management in terms of monitoring and underwriting 
(i.e. bad credit risk management) will lead to increased operating costs almost 
immediately, whereas loan defaults typically occur at a later point in time. This 
indicates that there may be challenges with endogeneity, as they do find evidence that 
after banks experience a decrease in cost efficiency, the level of non-accruing loans 
increase. Thus, the relationship between default on loans and operating costs seem to 
run in both directions. Although past research mainly has been based on the 
assumption of a positive relationship between default on loans and operating costs, the 
idea of default on loans negatively influencing the operating cost rate has been 
entertained in later research, e.g. in Mersland & Strøm (2013) where they note that a 
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higher default rate may reduce operational costs if the case is that the microfinance 
institution is appointing great effort in obtaining repayment on loans. There is however 
a lack of studies to support this statement. This thesis looks to close this gap somewhat 
by investigating the relationship between default on loans and operating costs in 
microfinance institutions. The study will account for the suspected endogenity issues 
by including an instrument variable to the model, thus adjusting for reversed causality. 
Consequently, the thesis studies the order of the relationship between the default on 
loans rate and operating costs rate as well as the direction of it.  
 
 
3.2 Past research 
Bateman (2010) has become one of the more known critics of microfinance with his 
claims that it does not work because of lack of consideration for people’s well-being. 
This claim is based on critique that microfinance institutions no longer follow their 
social mission of outreach to the poor. He further asserts that rather than helping 
clients smooth consumption and overcome poverty, microfinance institutions are 
chasing high profits and returns. His work provides an overview of problem areas in 
the industry that must be recognized, but there are however few studies to support his 
claims of mission drift, especially when viewing the industry as a whole. His critique 
does nevertheless raise important issues such as whether the level of the interest rate 
offered to microfinance customers is too high and if microfinance institutions operate 
with too high profitability. Mersland & Strøm (2013) investigate these questions from 
a cost perspective and find that the lending rate is strongly clustered around the zero 
profit margin and that the trend line is basically flat, starting with a zero profit margin 
and following a weak negative inclination. This shows that for their sample of 405 
microfinance institutions in 73 countries the generally high lending rates are due to 
other causes than high profit margins. In fact, their study suggests that microfinance 
institutions in general are reinforcing their position in the poorest client segments as 
they age, indicating that they are not operating on a profit motive.  
 
Conversely, Rhyne (1998) speculate whether microfinance institutions would be better 
able to serve the poor if the industry were to become more commercialized. The 
reasoning behind this suggestion is that the profit motives lead them to become more 
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efficient and willing to explore new markets for their products. Furthermore, her study 
finds that microfinance institutions with good performance were able to tailor their 
delivery methods to the poor so efficiently that the clients could afford the full cost of 
repayment, ultimately leaving the institutions to fulfil both missions of outreach and 
sustainability. Littlefield, Morduch and Hashemi (2003) support this view in their 
findings that performance is better in microfinance institutions where poorer 
customers are targeted. This study does lack generality, but nevertheless contradicts 
the claims of microfinance mission drift.  
 
Mersland & Strøm (2013) adds to the debate on microfinance mission drift by stating 
that the level on the interest rate given to microfinance customers and the profitability 
obtained by the institutions must be connected to the costs of providing the loans.  
Rhyne (1998) find that there is a connection between the financial viability of the 
microfinance institution and their willingness to set interest rates at levels that fully 
recover costs, and claims that those who do not set interest rates at such a level thus 
chose to remain dependent on subsidy. One interpretation of this is that some 
microfinance institutions are consequently subsidizing interest rates to their clients. 
The effect of the subsidy on interest rates and outreach to customers are too 
comprehensive to include in this thesis, but we do recognize that whether or not the 
microfinance institution is receiving subsidy may lead them to increase outreach on 
the expense of financial sustainability.  
 
Although Mersland & Strøm (2010) find no mission drift when viewing the 
microfinance industry as a whole, they do find that the size of average loans increase 
with increased average profits and average costs, suggesting that mission drift 
tendencies may be neutralized by a cost-efficiency focus in microfinance institutions. 
This builds to Rhyne’s (1998) findings that the social- and financial objectives of the 
institutions are in fact complementary, and above all that financial sustainability serves 
their mission of outreach to the poor. It becomes evident that the industry would take 
advantage from improving their cost efficiency. This thesis will investigate whether 
institutions can encounter this need by adjusting their tolerance for loan defaults. 
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3.3 Conceptual framework and research hypothesis 
Based on evidence from past research and the theoretical background this chapter will 
present the hypothesis and conceptual framework of the thesis. The purpose of the 
conceptual framework is to illustrate the hypothesized relationship between the default 
on loans rate and the operating cost rate in microfinance institutions.  
Past research shows that the relationship between default on loans and operating costs 
run in both directions (see Berger & de Young, 1997), meaning that default on loans 
can influence the operating costs rate, but the operating costs rate can also influence 
the level default on loans. This thesis is interested in the nature of this relationship, 
that is, the functional form of it. The hypothesis is based on the idea that the 
microfinance institutions today may be too concerned with maintaining low levels of 
default, perhaps to the degree to which they would be better off by easing up their 
strong focus on this and allow for their resources to be spent differently. The 
expectation is that there is a non-linear relationship between the two variables, and that 
this might be quadric and convex. That means that we expect that very low levels of 
default will lead to higher operating costs, due to great resources being spent to hold 
such levels. We expect that the cost will decrease as default rates increase because 
resources are freed. Yet, at some point the costs of defaults will have to exceed the 
savings gained by lightening the use of resources, so we expect to see that further 
default rates will lead to increasing operating costs again. The expected relationship 
can be illustrated as follows: 
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Figure 3.1 Expected relationship between the dependent and independent variable 
 
Thus, our hypotheses can be formulated: 
H1: There exist a statistically significant relationship between default on loans and 
operating costs in microfinance institutions.  
HA1: There does not exist a statistically significant relationship between default on 
loans and operating costs in microfinance institutions.  
 
H2a: There exist a non-linear relationship between default on loans and operating costs 
in microfinance institutions.  
HA2a: There does not exist a non-linear relationship between default on loans and 
operating costs in microfinance institutions.  
H2b: There exists a quadric, convex relationship between the default on loans rate and 
the operating costs rate in microfinance institutions. 
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HA2b: There does not exist a quadric, convex relationship between the default on loans 
rate and operating costs rate in microfinance institutions.  
 
The relationship is expected to be influence by several other factors, which is 
portrayed in the conceptual framework below and elaborated on in chapter 4.2.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Conceptual framework 
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4. Data 
 
4.1 Data and Sample 
This study is based on data collected by Mersland, referred to as the Mersland data 
base. The dataset covers financial and general data on 463 microfinance institutions in 
77 countries collected from risk evaluation reports by specialized rating agencies 
supported by the Rating Fund of Consutative Group to Assist the Poor: MicroRate, 
Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. The data set resembles Garmaise and 
Natvidad (2010), but contains over three times as many microfinance institutions in 
above twice the number of countries. The rating reports can be found at 
www.ratingfound2.org. Each rating was performed during the period 1996-2012. The 
data and its quality is well recognized in the academics and has been used as the basis 
for several academic articles published in development, management, economic and 
financial journals (see e.g. Mersland & Strøm, 2008; Mersland, 2009; Hartarska, Shen 
& Mersland, 2013; Mersland, & Urgeghe, 2013). An overview of the institutions and 
the countries represented in the data set is offered below. 
Overview of countries and number of microfinance institutions 
Country 
code 
Country No. of 
Microfinance 
institutions 
Country 
code 
Country No. of 
Microfinance 
institutions 
1 Albania 
3 
39 Russian Federation 
15 
2 Argentina 1 40 Senegal 11 
3 Armenia 2 41 South Africa 3 
4 Benin 8 42 Sri Lanka 2 
5 Bolivia 6 43 Tanzania 8 
6 Bosnia 
Hercegovina 10 
44 Togo 
4 
7 Brazil 
14 
45 Trinidad and 
Tobago 1 
8 Bulgaria 2 46 Tunisia 1 
9 Burkina Faso 3 47 Uganda 14 
10 Cambodia 14 48 Montenegro 2 
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11 Chile 2 49 Cameroun 5 
12 Colombia 12 50 Guinee 1 
13 Dominican 
Republic 5 
51 East Timor 
1 
14 Ecuador 18 52 Bangladesh 2 
15 Egypt 5 53 Nepal 5 
16 El Salvador 6 54 Vietnam 3 
17 Ethiopia 10 55 Azerbaijan 8 
18 Georgia 7 56 Mongolia 3 
19 Guatemela 8 57 Nigeria 5 
20 Haiti 3 58 Mozambique 1 
21 Honduras 10 59 Tajikistan 9 
22 India 32 60 Croatia 1 
23 Indonesia 4 61 Chad 1 
24 Jordan 3 62 Rwanda 5 
25 Kazakhstan 4 63 Zambia 3 
26 Kenya 12 64 China 4 
27 Kyrgyzstan 5 65 Serbia 1 
28 Madagascar 3 66 Ghana 5 
29 Mali 5 67 Malawi 1 
30 Mexico 21 68 Gambia 1 
31 Moldova 2 69 Kosovo 4 
32 Morocco 
7 
70 Rep of 
CongoBrazz 1 
33 Nicaragua 14 71 Burundi 1 
34 Pakistan 1 72 Niger 5 
35 Paraguay 
2 
73 DRC - Kinshasa 
1 
36 Peru 39 74 Afghanistan 1 
37 Philippines 15 75 Costa Rica 1 
38 Romania 2 76 Lebanon 2 
      77 Turkey 1 
Total number of microfinance institutions: 463 
Table 4.1 Overview of countries and microfinance institutions 
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Despite covering many microfinance institutions in several countries, the data set is 
not a flawless representative of the microfinance industry. The representation of very 
large microfinance institutions is relatively limited and it does not succeed in fully 
covering the next to infinite number of small savings and credit cooperatives. 
Nonetheless, the characteristics of the microfinance institutions in the Mersland 
dataset are found to be fairly similar to other publically available data, such as the 
larger MIX Market (www.mixmarket.org) (Mersland & Strøm, 2012b), and it has the 
benefit of being gathered by third parties. 
Below is an overview of the main characteristics of the microfinance institutions in the 
dataset. The overview presents the mean, minimum and maximum rates/amounts 
reported, as well as the standard deviation, median and number of observations. All 
outliers have been trimmed away so that the averages represent the mainstream 
microfinance institutions.  
   
 Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Count 
Average loan ($) 1,204 743 1,573 15 18,984 1,322 
Credit Clients 17,971 7,028 33,710 10 394,462 2,191 
Assets ($) 11,268,680 3,766,000 24,744,468 0 279,350,811 2,291 
Loan Portfolio ($) 8,183,922 2,771,352 17,070,439 3,425 156,789,000 2,298 
Equity Fraction 39.55% 34.04% 25.14% 0% 100% 2,220 
Portfolio Yield 37.79% 34.10% 18.45% 0.7% 127.7% 2,194 
Operating cost of portfolio 30.55% 22.40% 26.95% 2.93% 351.0% 2179 
Par30 5.56% 3.20% 7.51% 0.00% 54.70% 1.981 
Portf. write-off 2.79% 1.40% 4.36% 0.01% 42.0% 2,060 
Return on assets 1.36% 2.95% 12.04% -99.00% 34.20% 2,186 
Adjusted ROA -1.66% -0.20% 8.73% -43.60% 22.30% 1,102 
Table 4.2 Characteristics of microfinance institutions 
 
The overview reveals that the average loan disbursed by the microfinance institutions 
in our data set is approximately U.S. $1,204. Moreover, we notice that the minimum 
average loan disbursed by a microfinance institution is as low as U.S. $15. This 
illustrates that the average loan size is very small compared to what is common in 
commercial banks. The median of the reported numbers (U.S. $743) is even lower that 
the mean, which tells us that even though there are some “mega” microfinance 
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institutions, the mainstream stay true to the original intent of microfinance; offering 
small loans to the poor.  
 
When it comes to the number of credit clients, the mean in the dataset is 
approximately 17,971 clients per microfinance institution in any year. The median is 
however much smaller and tells us that the typical microfinance institution is small in 
terms of number of credit clients, although exceptions are present.  
As will be discussed in chapter 4.2.3 the total assets are one of the most common 
measures of the microfinance institutions’ size. The table above show that the 
institutions in our data set average around U.S. $11,3 millions over the years reported, 
and that the variation between the cases is great; from zero at the lower end to over 
U.S. $279 million on the upper end. The median does on the other hand tell us that the 
main part of the cases reported are of a smaller size, around U.S $3,76 million.   
 
The loan portfolios in our dataset averages around U.S. $8,18 million, but is spread out 
from only U.S. $3,425 on the lower end to over U.S $156 million on the upper end. 
The median only about 1/4 of the mean, which tells us that, as was true for the 
previous characteristics, the mainstream of the cases is in the lower end.  
 
The equity fraction displays the level of equity related to total assets, as reported on 
each microfinance institution’s balance sheet. The loan portfolio makes up the greatest 
part of the total assets. We see that both the mean and the median shows satisfying 
levels, which tells us that the microfinance institutions in our data set in general have 
been well capitalized over the measured periods.  
 
The table shows that in our dataset, the portfolio yield, which proxies the lending rate 
is on average 37.79%. This characteristic is mainly interesting viewed together with 
the operating cost per portfolio, which on average is 30.55%. We notice that the 
operating costs of the portfolio is not far from the same level as the portfolio yield, 
which supports the arguments presented in chapter 2.3, that the lending rates to a great 
degree is made up of high operating costs.  
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We also notice that the portfolio at risk (30 days) is 5.95% on average, which is also 
eating up parts of the portfolio yield. Consequently, the return on assets is low, 
averaging at 1.36% with a somewhat better median of 2.95%. The adjusted return on 
assets is low as well, averaging at -1.66% with a median of -0.20%. We notice that 
both for return on assets (ROA) and adjusted return on assets (AROA) the median is 
slightly above the mean, which tells us that the mainstream of microfinance 
institutions experience a somewhat better return that what is illustrated by the mean. 
 
 
4.2 Variables 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether there is a relationship between the 
default on loans rate and the operating costs rate in microfinance institutions and what 
the functional form of this relationship looks like. To ensure that this is estimated in 
the best way possible, several measures of both the default on loans-concept and the 
operating costs-concept was evaluated before the measures best suited for this study 
were chosen. A number of control variables that are assumed to have an effect on 
either default on loans rate or the operational cost rate will be included. The choice of 
variables is partly based on previous studies and partially based on own judgements. 
 
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
The operating expenses related to assets will be used as the measure for evaluation of 
the microfinance institutions’ the operating costs rate, as it is a well-known and 
commonly accepted measure for that purpose. The measure states the ratio of 
operating expenses to annual average total assets, where annualized figures are used if 
the report gives figures from within a year, using the formula: 
 
Operating expenses 
Annual average total assets 
 
The annual average total assets is calculated as follows: 
Total loan portfolio year X + Total loan portfolio year (X-1) 
2 
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Mersland & Strøm (2013) find that as the operating costs per client decreases, the 
microfinance institutions are able to grant lower average loans, and thus reach out to 
more people. This serves as a motivation for keeping operational costs as low as 
possible, as Mersland & Strøm (2010) find that microfinance institutions with the best 
potential to reach poor customers are also the ones that are most efficient.  
A basic assumption for the use of multivariate analysis is that the shape of the data 
distribution for an individual metric variable corresponds to a normal distribution 
(Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2010). Therefore, for all the variables a histogram 
was generated, displaying the normality line. For the variables not displaying normal 
distribution, a transformation was carried out using gladder tests to see if any of the 
suggested transformations provided a satisfying distribution. The results of the 
distribution tests pre- and post transformation can be found in appendix 1.  The tests 
showed that the logarithmic function of operating expenses related to assets is best 
suited for our model, presented as: lnoperexp_assets in data outputs.  
 
In addition to using operating expenses related to assets, this thesis will include an 
alternative measure for the operating costs rate, namely the logarithmic function of 
operating expenses related to portfolio, lnoperexp_portf. The purpose of including this 
additional measure is to check the robustness of the findings in terms of whether they 
can be supported by the use of other measures. If the measures provide similar results, 
the strength of the research will improve and the probability of drawing good 
conclusions will advance.  
 
The measure states the ratio of the operating expenses to the annual average loan 
portfolio, where figures are annualized if the report gives them from within a year, 
using the formula:  
Operating expenses 
Annual average total loan portfolio 
 
The average total loan portfolio is calculated as follows: 
Total loan portfolio year X + Total loan portfolio year (X-1) 
2 
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Results of regression using this alternative dependent variable can be found in 
appendix 2. 
 
4.2.2 Independent variable 
When estimating the microfinance institutions’ operating costs it is important to 
incorporate risk, which is commonly measured using non-performing ratios such as 
the portfolio at risk. Portfolio at risk (Par30) is an uncertainty measure, displaying the 
ratio of loans that are 30 days or more in arrears (Mersland & Strøm, 2012a). This 
consideration is necessary because high levels of non-performing loans demand added 
resources to administer the risk. The loan portfolio quality is very important to the 
performance of the microfinance institutions, as it represents one of their largest 
assets. Because the loans in general are not backed with bankable collateral, such as a 
mortgage on a house, etc., the risk associated with poor management of the loan 
portfolio can be very dramatic (Jansson, 2003). 
 
Hartarska et. al., 2013 find that costs increase with risk independently of whether 
output is measured in dollars or in number of active clients, but Albuntas, Carbo, 
Gardener & Molyneux (2007), on the other hand, argue that risk is inversely related to 
inefficiency and that in most cases cost inefficiency is positively related to asset size. 
Mersland & Strøm (2013) further argue that some microfinance institutions may use 
vast resources in effort to obtaining repayment on their loans, and that higher default 
rates in these cases may reduce operating costs.  
 
Based on existing theory we expect to see a relationship between default on loans and 
operating costs in microfinance institutions, and that this relationship is non-linear. 
Our study uses the logarithmic function of Par30, presented as lnpar30 in the data 
output. 
 
In addition to using Par30, this thesis will include an alternative measure for the 
default on loans rate, namely the logarithmic function of the combined credit risk, 
lncomb_credrisk. This measure is computed combining the write-off ratio and the 
Par30 in each microfinance institution. The purpose of including this additional 
measure is to check the robustness of the findings in terms of whether they can be 
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supported by the use of other measures. If the measures provide similar results, the 
strength of the research will improve and the probability of drawing good conclusions 
will advance.  
 
4.2.3 Reversed causality 
Microfinance institutions that are less efficient may be tempted to take on greater 
levels of risk to counterweigh lost returns (Albuntas et al., 2007). On the other hand, 
efficiency can be influenced by the level of risk the microfinance institution 
undertakes. Berger & De Young (1997) find that commercial banks with high levels of 
non-performing loans also experience declining cost efficiency. This is consistent with 
the theory that extra monitoring and administration of risky portfolios lead to higher 
operating costs. So far, to my knowledge, no study on this relationship has been 
conducted in the microfinance industry. As argued in chapter 2, we do however expect 
to find similar results for microfinance institutions. Berger & De Young’s (1997) data 
further insinuate that low levels of cost efficiency lead to increases in nonperforming 
loans, consistent with the theory that inefficient firms may appeal to undertaking more 
risk. Because theory tells us that there might be issues concerning reversed 
causality/endogeneity, instrument variables will be included in the model. Endogenity 
is a well-known and persistent problem in research on corporate governance (Bøhren 
& Strøm, 2007) that makes it difficult to distinguish cause from effect. This 
phenomenon relates to the independent variable explaining the dependent variable, 
while the dependent variable in turn explains the independent variable (Dahlum, 
2014). 
 
The problems concerning endogeneity can be overcome using predetermined variables 
(Kang & Sivaramakrishnan, 1995), such as the first and second lag of the independent 
variable, as instrument variables. These variables are found in the IV regression in 
chapter 6.3 as lagPar30 and lag2Par30, respectively.  
 
4.2.3 Control variables 
Loan size 
Because microfinance institutions serve a social mission of outreach to poor people, 
small loans of short duration is common in the industry. With the smaller loans banks 
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are able to extend credit to more people, including those who are only able to repay 
very small amounts, i.e. the poor people. The size of loans is thus a commonly used 
measure of microfinance institutions’ outreach and fulfilment of their social mission 
(Bhatt & Tang, 2001; Cull, Demigüc-Kunt & Morduch, 2007). In this study the size of 
loans will be included as a control variable as it is thought to affect the operating costs 
as well as on the microfinance institution’s risk in several ways. Firstly, the banks 
incur a fixed element in loan provision expenses, making smaller loans relatively more 
costly compared to larger loans. Secondly, given a fixed amount of resources, outreach 
to more of the poorer customers will compromise larger business with the more 
fortunate customers, leading to extra costs in terms of risk assessment of new 
customers and compensation for lost business (Mersland & Strøm, 2012a). Thirdly, 
the smaller loans provide the microfinance institution with a way of risk 
diversification, as credit is spread out on a large amount of borrowers.  
 
The size of loans, or the loan amount, will be represented by the average disbursed 
loan amount, namely the variable lnloan_disb_av. The average loan is defined as the 
loan portfolio divided by the number of credit clients in the institution, and is thus a 
usage measure. Based on existing theory our prediction is that we will see a negative 
effect on the operating costs of the microfinance institutions when the average size of 
loans increases.  
 
Microfinance institution size 
The size of the microfinance institution will be included as a control variable as it is 
reasonable to assume that larger institutions will accumulate scale advantages that 
enable them to obtain lower operating costs. This assumption is supported in Mersland 
& Strøm (2013) where they find that the size of the microfinance institution, measured 
in total assets, will have a negative effect on the operating costs rate of that institution. 
Total assets is the main and commonly accepted measure of company size used in 
finance, and is available and well suited in this study. We will correct for country-
specific traditions and influence by adjusting total assets to the GDP per capita in each 
country, as suggested by Aguilera and Jackson (2003). The variable is named 
lnTotalassets_GDPadj in the data output. 
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Allen and Rai (1996) find clear scale advantages in financial institutions. Because of 
the tremendous growth in the microfinance sector, the institutions are expected to 
achieve cost savings in the future, resulting in further lending by means of small loans 
and ultimately a greater outreach to the poor. Moreover, with increasing competition 
the banks that have achieved scale will have a competitive advantage, which further 
supports an expectation of a negative relationship between microfinance institution 
size and operating costs. In addition to scale advantages larger microfinance 
institutions are thought to have an advantage in popularity and reputation, which in 
turn will attract new customers without much effort from the microfinance institution. 
Thus, based on existing theory we expect to see a negative relationship between the 
size of the microfinance institution and its operating costs rate.  
 
Microfinance institution age 
Mersland & Strøm (2010) propose that the microfinance institutions gain experience 
through its daily operations, recurring interactions with clients and market 
transactions, and that they over time will accumulate cost-effective ways to run their 
business. Thus, we can expect that the microfinance institutions will reduce its 
operating cost rate over as they age, and that the regression will show a negative 
relationship between the age and the operating cost rate. This expectation is further 
supported by Caudill et al. (2009) who find that the cost efficiency in microfinance 
institutions increase over time.  
 
Because of this, the MFI age is included as a control variable and named sqrt_age in 
the data output. The microfinance institution age is derived by subtracting the original 
start-up of the organization from the year. The term is then squared to meet the 
assumptions of multivariate regression.  
 
Inflation 
The study controls for regional factors by including the countries’ inflation rate. Some 
regions may have suffered particularly severe economic upturns or downturns relative 
to the rest during parts of the sample period. This is expected to influence the 
operating costs of microfinance institutions located in those regions. Moreover, 
including the inflation rate and benchmarking the MFI size against the GDP per capita 
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will help control for country heterogeneity. 
 
The study uses the logarithmic function of the inflation, marked lninflation, and states 
the inflation in the country at the end of a given period. Because the operating costs in 
any microfinance institution is contingent on the general price level of the country, we 
expect to se a positive relationship between the countries’ inflation rate and the 
operating cost rate in the corresponding MFIs.  
 
Market orientation 
United nations (2006) reveals that the rural areas are where poverty is most 
concentrated. Reaching the rural areas should thus be a significant goal in 
microfinance, in accordance with the social mission of outreach. People living in rural 
areas are generally in more financial need than those in urban areas. Rural areas are 
thus harder for microfinance institutions to enter and operate in. It can be argued that it 
is costly to serve rural clients because they lack skills regarding microenterprises; 
hence, microfinance institutions may offer literacy/training services, resulting in 
higher costs. Mersland & Strøm (2013) find that higher operating cost per client leads 
microfinance institutions to seek customers in urban communities. Consequently, their 
study suggests that there is a positive relationship between outreach to rural areas and 
operating costs.  
 
Based on these arguments we expect to see a positive relationship between the 
outreach to rural areas and operating costs, i.e. that microfinance institutions with 
outreach to rural areas incur higher operating costs. In our model the market 
orientation is included using the dummy variable rural. This variable has the value “1” 
for microfinance institutions that serve rural customers and “0” for those who do not.  
 
Loan methodology 
As a response to the lack of collateral and reduced chances of legally enforcing 
repayment, the microfinance industry commonly issue group loans where the loans are 
given to individuals, but whole groups are responsible for the repayment of it 
(Armendàriz and Morduch, 2010). The idea is that the social capital implied by being 
part of a group substitutes collateral (Tirole, 2006), and that group members will 
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monitor other members (Varian, 1990). This would lower costs for microfinance 
institutions in terms of monitoring and control. However, Mersland and Strøm (2010a) 
find that the benefit of group lending is often outperformed by the cost associated with 
it. 
 
The loan methodology is included as a control variable in the model using the dummy 
DM_individ, that states whether or not the microfinance institution offer individual 
loans; the value “1” being “yes” and “0” being “no”. Existing theory is somewhat 
inconclusive about the relationship between individual lending and operating cost, and 
we can expect the relationship to be either negative or positive. A negative relationship 
would imply that microfinance institutions that offer loans to individuals incur lower 
operating costs, whereas a positive relationship would imply that operating costs 
increase with loans offered to individuals. 
 
Table 4.3 below provides an overview of the variables used in this study. 
 
Variable Definition  
Dependent variables  
ln Operating expense/assets The natural logarithm of operating expenses related to 
annual average total assets 
ln Operating expense/portf The natural logarithm of operating expenses related to 
annual average loan portfolio 
Independent variables  
ln PaR30 Portfolio at risk (30days). States the ratio of loans that 
are 30 days or more in arrears. 
Control variables  
Loan size The natural logarithm of average disbursed loan 
amount. The average loan is defined as the loan 
portfolio divided by the number of credit clients. 
MFI size The natural logarithm of total assets adjusted for 
country GDP per person. 
MFI age The squared function of original start-up of the 
organization (establ_activ) subtracted from year (yr).  
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Inflation The natural logarithm of the inflation in the country at 
the end of a given period as indicated in the report. 
Market orientation Measures outreach to rural areas. The value “1” for 
institutions that serve rural customers and “0” for those 
who do not.  
Loan methodology States whether or not the microfinance institution offer 
individual loans; the value “1” being “yes” and “0” 
being “no”.  
Table 4.3 Overview of variables 
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5. Method 
 
Research is a process that aims at providing new knowledge and increased 
understanding through systematic efforts, and is used by businesses to ensure clever, 
well-versed decisions (Joyner, 2013). This chapter will present the research design, 
analytical method and variables used in my research on the relationship between loan 
default and operating costs in microfinance institutions.  
 
 
5.1 Research design 
The research design provides a framework that identifies the methods and procedures 
for collecting and analysing the data that will be used in the research, and offer an 
outline of actions to be made (Joyner, 2013). Joyner (2013) hold that objectives of the 
study identified in the first stages of the research should be incorporated to the 
research design to make certain that the data used is suitable for the particular research 
problem. This study aims to portray the relationship between variables and to say 
something about cause and effect to these variables. More specifically the study 
investigates the effect on the operating cost rate caused by default rates in 
microfinance institutions. Causal research attempts to establish the effect of an action 
(Joyner, 2013) and is thus the appropriate research design for this study.  
 
 
5.2 Regression analysis 
As regression analysis is a very versatile dependence technique, it is the most 
commonly used and is applicable in all aspect of business decision-making (Hair, 
Money, Samouel & Page, 2007). It is used to measure the linear dependency between 
a dependent variable and one or more independent variables, and is widely accepted as 
an appropriate tool in identifying causal relationships (Joyner, 2013)  
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5.2.1 Multiple regression analysis 
Multiple regression analysis is a general statistical technique used to analyse the 
relationship between a dependent variable and a number of independent variables. It 
can be formulated as: 
 
Y1=β0 +β1X1+β2X2+....+βnXn+ε 
where all variables are metric.  
 
Y represents the dependent variable and X the different independent and control 
variables. β0 is the intercept, while β1, β2…βn represents the slope. The beta 
coefficients, βn are standardised coefficients that permit comparison between 
coefficients as to their relative explanatory power of the dependent variable (Hair et 
al., 2007). The set of these weighted independent variables structure the regression 
variates, also referred to as the “regression model” or “regression equation”, which is a 
linear organization of the independent variables that most precisely predict the 
dependent variable (Hair et al., 2007). The error term, ε, represents all other 
unobservable factors that may affect Y, so called “noise”. This is the degree to which 
the data values do not truly measure the characteristics of the dependent variable (Hair 
et al., 2007).  
 
 
5.3 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
The OLS is a mathematical technique used to ensure that the regression line used to 
identify the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable 
produce the smallest possible total error. More specifically the model generates a 
straight line that minimizes the sum of squared deviations of the actual values from its 
predicted regression line (Joyner, 2013). The deviations are squared to control for 
positive and negative faults cancelling each other out. In the OLS model the deviations 
of observations from the regression line are represented by the symbol e, and no other 
line can produce less error. The OLS criterion is as follows (Joyner, 2013): 
 
ni=1 ei
2
  is minimum where: 
ei = Yi-Ŷi (the residual) 
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Yi = actual observed value of the dependent variable 
Ŷi = estimated value of the dependent variable 
N = number of observations 
i = number of the particular observation 
 
 
5.4 Prerequisites for multiple regressions 
As each of the independent variables has some explanatory power on Y, more 
variables will always cause a larger portion of Y to be explained. Enhancements in 
prediction of the dependent variable can thus be made by adding more independent 
variables and even transforming them to denote aspects of the model that are not 
originally linear (Hair et al., 2007). To do so, several assumptions about the 
relationship between the variables must be made (Chen, Ender, Mitchell & Wells 
2003): 
1. Normality of the error term distribution  
2. Collinearity  
3. Independence of error terms (autocorrelation) 
4. Constant variance of error terms (homoscedasticity) 
5. Linearity of the phenomenon measured 
These assumptions will be further explained below and tested in chapter 6.1. 
 
5.4.1 Normality 
The assumption of normality refers to the shape of the data distribution for an 
individual metric variable and its equivalence to the normal distribution. If the 
deviation from the normal distribution is considerable, all consequential statistical 
tests are invalid as normality is necessary to do the t and F statistics (Hair et al., 2010). 
The normality of a variable distribution can be checked for by generating a histogram 
with a normality plot and by analysing the kurtosis and skewness values of each 
variable. 
 
Kurtosis refers to the level of peak or flatness of the distribution compared to that of 
the normal distribution. If the distribution is more peaked than the normal distribution, 
it is said to be leptokurtic (Hair et al., 2010). In this case the value of the kurtosis will 
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be greater than 3.00 (Acock, 2012) and the tails of the distribution will be too thin. 
When the distribution is flatter than the normal distribution and the tails are too thick, 
we will see a kurtosis value of less than 3.00 (Acock, 2012) and we say that the 
distribution is platykurtic (Hair et al., 2007). In multivariate data analysis kurtosis 
values up to 10.0 is considered acceptable when evaluating the normality of a variable 
(Acock, 2012). 
 
5.4.2 Collinearity 
Collinearity is concerned with the linear relationship between variables. When more 
than two variables are involved it is referred to as multicollinearity. The main concern 
with multicollinearity is that as the degree of it increases, the regression model 
estimates of the coefficients become volatile and the standard errors for the 
coefficients can get uncontrollably inflated (Chen et al., 2003). Increases in 
multicollinearity reduce the overall R
2
 that can be achieved, cofound estimation of the 
regression coefficients and negatively affect the statistical significance tests of 
coefficients (Hair et al., 2010).  
 
5.4.3 Independence of error terms (autocorrelation) 
The independence of error terms is about making sure that errors linked with one 
observation are not correlated with the errors of any other observation (Chen et al., 
2003). This assumption is important in time series studies where it is probable that 
errors for observations between contiguous periods will be more highly correlated than 
for observations more separated in time. This phenomenon is referred to as 
autocorrelation.  
 
5.4.4 Constant variance of error terms (homoscedasticity) 
Homogeneity of variance of the residuals is among the most important assumptions for 
the ordinary least squares regression. Homoscedasticity refers to the assumption that 
dependent variables demonstrate equal levels of variance transversely in the 
assortment of predictor variables (Hair et al., 2010) and is advantageous because the 
variance of the dependent variable explained in the dependence relationship should not 
be restricted to a limited range of the independent values.  
 
  47 
5.4.5 Linearity of the phenomenon measured 
When conducting linear regression, the relationship between the response variable and 
the predictors should be linear. If this assumption is not withheld, the linear regression 
will try to fit the model into a straight line anyways. It is therefore necessary to control 
for linearity and make adjustments to the regression model if the relationship between 
the dependent and independent variable is non-linear. Tests and adjustments are 
carried out in chapter 6.1. 
 
 
5.5 Panel Data 
Longitudinal data or Panel data is defined as continual measurements on the same 
individual unit at different points in time, making it possible to detect variation over 
time as well as variation over unit (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Cameron & Trivedi 
(2010) further explains that panel data can be either balanced, meaning that all 
individual units are observed in all time periods (Ti = T for all i), or unbalanced. This 
study is based on yearly reports from 463 Microfinance institutions in the period 
between 1996-2012, where the range of institutions has been consistent over the years, 
thus making the data set suitable for an analysis using panel data. The advantage by 
using the same measurement parameters at the different points in time is that it allows 
us to detect relationships and variations in the sample that would otherwise not be 
apparent. It further permits the researcher to control for variables that cannot be 
observed or measured, like differences in business practices across companies or 
cultural factors (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Cameron & Trivedi (2010) emphasize on two 
main methods for analysing panel data, namely “fixed effects” and “random effects”.  
 
5.5.1 Fixed effects 
The fixed effects method investigates the relationship between the independent, 
explanatory variable and the dependent variable in a single unit. Each unit is defined 
with individual characteristics that may affect the explanatory variables and may 
impact or bias the findings the analysis provides.  This impact or bias rationalizes the 
assumption of the correlation between the unit’s error term and explanatory variable 
(Torres-Reyna, 2007). The model removes the effect of time-invariant characteristics 
and allows us to assess the net effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
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variable, and is thus suited when one is concerned with merely analysing the impact of 
variables that vary over time. As each unit is different, its error term and individual 
characteristics, captured by its constant, should not be correlated with other units 
(Torres-Reyna, 2007). (Torres-Reyna, 2007) expresses the model of fixed effects: 
 
Yit = I + 1Xit + uit   
 
Where: 
I (i=1….n) is the unknown intercept for each unit (n = unit-specific intercepts) 
Yit is the dependent variable where i = unit and t = time. 
Xit represent one independent variable 
1 is the coefficient for the independent variable 
uit is the error term 
 
The intercept, I, captures the effect of the individual characteristics of the units and 
will be constant over time. The independent variable, Xit, is weighted by 1, which 
measures the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, Yit.  
 
This model is limited by the degrees of freedom, which tends to be low. This is 
because one degree of freedom is lost per cross-sectional observation by eliminating 
the properties that are time-invariant. Additionally, the explanatory variables that do 
not vary over time in each unit have a perfect collinearity with fixed effects, making 
them and their coefficients unfit for the model (Joyner, 2013) 
 
5.5.2 Random effects 
The random effects method assumes that the variations across units are random and 
uncorrelated with the explanatory or independent variables in the model (Torres-
Reyna, 2007). Greene (2012) explains: “the crucial distinction between fixed and 
random effects is whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are 
correlated with the repressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or 
not”.  Each cross sectional unit has an intercept given through a distribution that is 
centred in an average intercept (Studenmund, 2011), leaving the intercept independent 
of the error term for each individual observation. Torres-Reyna (2007) expresses the 
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model of random effects: 
 
Yit = I + 1Xit + uit + it 
 
The intercept, I, in this model is based on the normal distribution of all the units. Like 
in the fixed effects model the independent variable, Xit, is weighted by 1, which 
measures the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, Yit.  uit 
represents the between-unit error, whereas it represents the within-unit error. One 
assumption of the random effects is that the unit’s error term is uncorrelated with the 
predictors, thus allowing for time-invariant variables to act as explanatory variables 
(Torres-Reyna, 2007) and it is necessary to describe the individual characteristics that 
may influence the predictor variables. Problems may occur if some variables are 
unavailable, leading to variable bias being left out of the model (Studenmund, 2011). 
 
Nevertheless, here are some evident benefits of selecting the random effects method 
over the fixed effects method. Firstly, the random effects model will have a higher 
degree of freedom as it estimates parameters that describes the distribution of the 
intercepts rather than estimating the intercept for each unit (Studenmund, 2011). 
Secondly, the model allows you to estimate the coefficients of the predictors that are 
constant over time. 
 
5.5.3 Hausman test 
The Hausman test can be used to investigate whether the fixed effects model is 
appropriate for analysing a dataset by investigating how the independent variable and 
the intercept are correlated (Hausman, 1978). The principle behind the test is to 
compare two predictors where one is fixed both in the null hypothesis and in the 
alternative hypothesis, and the other fixed only in the null hypothesis (Verbeek, 2012). 
The null hypothesis is that the random effects model is the preferred method, whereas 
the alternative hypothesis is that the fixed effects fixed effects model is preferred 
(Greene, 2012). The test identifies whether the individual error terms correlate with 
the independent variables. If they do not correlate the random effects model is the 
most appropriate method. The decision is based on an evaluation of the p-value, which 
is defined as prob > chi2 in the results table of the Hausman test (Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
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If the measured p-value is greater than the selected significant level, the random 
effects model will be most appropriate to the tested dataset. To control for fixed 
effects, a Hausman test will be conducted on the basis of a model with fixed effects 
and a model with random effects. Based on the results, one of the models will be 
chosen.  
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6. Results and analysis 
 
The ability of an added independent variable to improve the prediction of the 
dependent variable is linked to the correlations to the additional independent variables 
already in the regression equation, as well as to its correlation to the dependent 
variable (Hair et al., 2010). Collinearity expresses this relationship and is measured as 
the correlation between two independent variables. This implies that two variables are 
near perfect linear combinations of one another (Chen et al., 2003). When the 
correlation concerns three or more independent variables (evidenced when one 
variable is regressed against the others) it is called multicollinearity. Hair et al. (2010) 
affirm that: “the impact of multicollinearity is to reduce any single independent 
variable’s predictive power by the extent to which it is associated with the other 
independent variables”. When the relationship among the predictors is (near) perfectly 
linear, the estimates for a regression model cannot be distinctly calculated. 
 
To control for this, a correlation analysis will be executed. Hair et al. (2010) explains 
that bivariate correlations of 0.70 or higher generally is considered to be problematic. 
Additionally, even lower correlations can be problematic if they are greater than the 
correlations between the independent and dependent variables. Nevertheless, it is 
commonly accepted to allow values up to 0.90 (see e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; 
Tamhane & Dunlop, 2000) in the correlation matrix as further tests of 
multicollinerarity will confirm/expose whether this is an issue in the model.  Below is 
an illustration of the correlation analysis.  
 
 
Table 6.1 Correlation matrix 
 
Table 6.1 above show that all correlations are well below the generally accepted limit 
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of 0.70 and will remain in the model for further analysis.  
 
 
6.1 Test of assumptions underlying the regression analysis 
Before the regression is run it is practical to test the underlying assumptions of linear 
regression, namely: normality, collinearity, homoscedasticity, independence of error 
terms and linearity. The results of the tests will be displayed below with comments 
about required corrections and adjustments. 
 
6.1.1 Normality 
To ensure that the p-values of the coefficient can be considered reliable, the error 
terms of the variables have to be normally distributed. This can be controlled for by 
predicting the residuals, r, before running a Kennel density estimate of these. The 
Kennel density estimate will compare the distribution of the residuals to the normal 
distribution. Additionally, a standardized normal probability plot, pnorm, which 
displays the distribution function, and quantiles plot, qnorm, which gives the quantile 
function, will be included to confirm or discredit the results of the Kernel density 
estimate. The pnorm provides the cumulative probability distribution at a specified 
value of x, and will be interpreted by looking at deviations from the straight line that 
represents the normal probability. The qnorm graphs the quantiles of a variable against 
the quantiles of a normal distribution, and like the pnorm it is interpreted by looking at 
the deviations from the straight line representing the normal distribution.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Test of normality 
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Figure 6.2 Standardized normal probability plot    Figure 6.3 Quantiles plot 
 
The figures above show that the deviation of the residuals from the normal distribution 
is minimal. The Kernel density estimate tells us that there is a slight shift to the right 
on the residuals, but this is trivial and the error terms can be considered normally 
distributed. This is supported by the standardized normal probability plot, where it is 
evident that the residuals follow the straight line closely. The plot of variable quantiles 
against the quantiles of a normal distribution shows that there are some slight 
deviations from normal at the tails, as can be seen in the Kernel density estimate 
above. The qnorm is sensitive to non-normality near the tails, and we can expect to see 
greater deviations from normal here than in the mid-range. In total, the deviations from 
normal seem to be minor and trivial, and the assumption of normality is considered 
upheld. 
 
6.1.2 Collinearity 
To ensure that the estimations of the coefficients remain stable and that the error terms 
do not increase, it is necessary to control for collinearity/multicollinearity. A 
correlations matrix like the one displayed in table 6.1 gives some indications of 
whether collinearity will be problematic or not, but it is common practise to conduct a 
VIF-test on the regression to confirm the indications from the correlations matrix. The 
variance inflation factor (VIF) provides an index that measures how much the variance 
of an estimated regression coefficient is increased due to collinearity. 
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Table 6.2 VIF-test 
 
General levels of multicollinearity tolerance are up to 0.10, which corresponds to a 
VIF of 10 (Hair et al., 2010). Overall, the variables included in this model show 
satisfying results in the VIF-test, and the underlying assumption for multiple 
regression is met.  
 
6.1.3 Independence of error terms (autocorrelation) 
To control for autocorrelation a paired comparison of the variables related to the same 
variables in the previous year can be conducted. 
  
 
Table 6.3 extract from test for autocorrelation  
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The extract above illustrates the comparison between the dependent variable in two 
continuous years. The full report can be found in appendix 3. The results show no 
specific pattern and a low degree if autocorrelation. Accordingly, the model does not 
breach this assumption.  
 
6.1.4 Homoscedasticity 
To test the basic assumption that the variance of the error term is constant, meaning 
that there is homogeneity in the variance, one can create a scatter plot of residuals 
compared to the predicted values. A well-fitted model is recognized by the absence of 
patterns to the residuals when they are plotted against the fitted values (Chen et al., 
2003). In cases where the variance of the residuals is non-constant the residual 
variance is said to be heteroscedastic.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Residuals plotted against fitted values 
 
The plot shows some small tendencies towards heteroscedasticity near the red line, 
which indicates that it may be a problem for the model. Because the tendencies are not 
severe, it is difficult make any conclusions based on the plot alone. Further tests are 
necessary to investigate whether the assumption of homoscedasticity is upheld.  
 
To control for heteroscedasticity a White’s test will be conducted. The implementation 
of the test will be based on the results from the VIF-test and thus, it includes the 
variables with the lowest amount of multicollinearity. The null hypothesis is that there 
is homoscedasticity in the variance. If the p-values in the White’s test are below the 
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chosen 5% significance level, H0 can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis that 
there is heteroscedasticity in the variance will remain.  
 
 
Figure 6.5 White’s and Cameron & Triverdi’s test 
 
The result of the White’s test show that prob>chi2 = 0.0033, and the null hypothesis 
will thus be rejected. This means that based on the White’s test there are problems 
with heteroscedasticity in this model. The test is very sensitive to model assumptions, 
such as the assumption of normality (Chen et al., 2003). Due to this sensitivity, it is 
common practice to combine the test with the Breusch-Pagan test and the plot in figure 
6.4 to make a judgement on the severity of the heteroscedasticity and to decide if 
correction is needed.  
 
 
Figure 6.6 Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity 
 
In the Breusch-Pagan test the null hypothesis is that there is a constant variance, 
meaning that the variance of the residuals is homogeneous. The result of this test gives 
us a p-value of 0.2731. The null hypothesis is thus not rejected at a 10% significant 
level. Consequently, the residual plot, White’s and Cameron & Triverdi’s test and 
Breusch-Pagan test demonstrate inconsistent results. Because the residual plot does 
not show severe tendencies of heteroscedastic it could be considered acceptable to go 
ahead with the analysis without corrections for heteroscedasticity. However, because 
constant variance of error terms is one of the most important assumptions for 
  57 
multivariate analysis, we will make adjustments to ensure that heteroscedasticity is not 
a problem in this model.  
 
By using robust standard errors we are able to combat several trivial concerns about 
failure to meet assumptions, like issues with normality or heteroscedasticity (Chen et 
al., 2003). When we implement the robust option the point estimates of the 
coefficients remain the same as in ordinary OLS, but the standard errors consider 
issues concerning heterogeneity and lack of normality. This is illustrated by changes in 
the standard errors and t-tests, but will not result in changes in the coefficients. The 
model will be run with robust standard errors in the analysis starting in chapter 6.1.5. 
 
6.1.5 Linearity 
When conducting linear regression, the relationship between the response variable and 
the predictors should be linear. If this assumption is not withheld, the linear regression 
will, according to Chen et al. (2003): “try to fit a straight line to data that does not 
follow a straight line”. Conducting a scatter plot between the predictor and the 
response variable will control for linearity. If nonlinearity is present we can expect to 
see a plot that does not follow a straight line, e.g. a big wave-shaped curve or a curved 
band. 
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Figure 6.7 Linearity scatter plots 
 
The results of the scatterplots are various, but in this case they are considered to be 
acceptable in regards to the linearity of the control variables. Adjustments could be 
made to ensure that the plots more accurately follow the straight line, but such 
adjustments have proved to aggravate issues in other assumptions, such as normality 
and multicollinearity. These assumptions are considered to be more important - and 
the issues associated with them more problematic. Thus, there will be no adjustments 
to the control variables in the model on the basis of the tests for linearity.  
 
It is difficult to make a statement on the linearity of the independent variable, lnpar30, 
based on its scatterplot. Theoretically it is suspected to have a non-linear effect on 
operating costs, and thus the relationship will be further investigated in the following 
section where we test the functional form in the model. 
 
Test of functional form 
In order to test the functional form of the model it is necessary to conduct a 
preliminary regression on which the functional tests will be based.  
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Figure 6.8 Preliminary regression with robust standard errors.  
 
The results show a negative and significant effect of default on loans on operating 
costs per assets. However, it is unclear whether this is modelled correctly, as we might 
have breached the assumption of linearity. It is suspected that the effect of lnpar30 is 
quadric and thus the shape of the bivariate relationship between lnpar30 and 
lnoperexp_assets should be assessed. A variable that predicts the value based on a 
locally weighted regression of default on loans on operating costs is created using the 
lowess command.  
 
 
Figure 6.9 Prediction of relationship between lnpar30 and lnoperexp_assets 
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The graph illustrates a concave curvilinear relationship.  This should be modelled this 
in the regression. When operating with a continuous measure like lnpar30 the best 
way of including the relationship in the model is by including a quadratic term 
(lnpar30*lnpar30) in our model, presented by c.lnpar30#c.lnpar30 in the table below. 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Regression including quadric term for dependent variable 
 
Based on the above regression the plot of the effect of default on loans on operating 
costs is extracted: 
 
Figure 6.11 Predictive margins 
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The results tell us that there is a quadric and concave relationship between default on 
loans and operating costs in microfinance institutions, and the model will thus include 
the term for the quadric function of loan default.  
 
 
6.2 Fixed or random effect 
 
To decide whether to go for a model with fixed or random effects in the data analysis, 
a Hausman test will be conducted. Theory tells us that if there is reason to believe that 
differences across entities have some influence on the dependent variable, random 
effects should be used (Torres-Reyna, 2007). It is reasonable to assume that individual 
characteristics in the microfinance institutions are correlated to operating costs in each 
institution, so according to theory, the random effects method should be selected for 
the purposes of this analysis. In contrast to the fixed effects model the random effects 
model further assumes that the variation across the microfinance institutions are 
random and uncorrelated with the rate of default on loans. To verify this, a Hausman 
test will be executed. Firstly, the dataset will be declared panel data: 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Panel- and time variable specification 
 
The figure confirm that the dataset is declared to be panel data, where the panel 
variable is the case, which is the identification variable for the different microfinance 
institutions (one case = one microfinance institution). The dataset is set up to sort the 
microfinance institutions after their case number and after the year of which the data 
was retrieved. Moreover, figure 6.12 display the dataset to be categorized as 
unbalanced, meaning that not all individual units (cases) are observed in all time 
periods (years) (Ti T for all i). Panel data theory confirms that this will not be an 
issue in the analysis.  
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To conduct the Hausman test, it is necessary to carry out one regression using fixed 
effects and one regression using random effects. The results of these regressions can 
be found in appendix 4. After the fixed- and random effects regressions are run, the 
Hausman test is conducted to test which model is appropriate in this study. 
 
 
Figure 6.13 Hausman test 
 
In the Hausman test the null hypothesis is that the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic, meaning that random effects should be used. The alternative hypothesis is 
that the difference in coefficients is systematic and that fixed effects should be used. 
The test shows prob>chi2 = 0.0712. At a chosen significant level of 5% H0 can thus 
not be rejected. Consequently, the results of the Hausman test in figure 6.13 support 
the theory that random-effects is appropriate for this study.  
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6.2.1 Random effects results 
The random effects regression provides the following results: 
 
 
Figure 6.14 Random-effects regression 
 
When evaluating the signs of the coefficients we see that most of them are consistent 
with the assumptions made in chapter 4 about the effects of these variables. Default on 
loans (lnpar30) negatively influences operating costs (lnoperexp_assets), suggesting 
that as the default on loans decreases, the operating cost rate will increase. As default 
on loans constitute the main explanatory variable in this study, it is important that this 
is confirmed significant. At a 5% significant level, the p-value of 0.004 states that the 
effect of the variable on operating costs is in fact significant. 
The variable c.lnpar30##c.lnpar30 represents the squared term of the independent 
variable, default on loans. This variable also negatively influence the operating costs 
per assets, and by a 5% significant level it is indeed significant.   
 
The negative sign of the loan size variable, ln_loan_disb_av, is consistent with the 
assumptions made about it; the smaller the loans are, the higher the microfinance 
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institutions’ costs. This can be explained by the assumption that the costs of 
processing a loan will be similar regardless of the loan size, leaving small loans to be 
relatively more costly. This control variable can be considered significant at a very 
low significant level and the effect of it on the operating costs rate is noteworthy. 
 
The microfinance institutions’ size, measured by the GDP-adjusted total assets, 
lnTotalassets_GDPadj, is shown to be negatively correlated with the operating costs 
rate of the institutions, suggesting that the microfinance institutions’ scale increases, 
the operating cost rate will decrease. This is consistent with the theory of scale 
advantages, discussed in chapter 4. At a 5% significant level also this effect on 
operating costs per assets is significant.  
 
Based on this regression the age of the microfinance institutions, sqrt_age, is 
positively correlated to the operating costs rate of the institution, suggesting that as the 
microfinance institutions age, the operating costs rate in the will increase. This is not 
consistent with theory about “learning-by-doing” and the expectation of a negative 
relationship. One possible explanation is that routines and procedures may not be as 
tightly followed over time, i.e. that the institutions experience “slack” that outweigh 
the effect of gained experience. However, at a 5% or 10% significant level the effect 
of the microfinance institution’s age on the operating costs is not significant in the 
model.  
 
The model shows that inflation will have a positive effect operating costs, which 
means that the cost will increase with the general inflation in the area where 
microfinance institution is located. This is consistent with the theoretical expectations, 
and the effect can be said to be significant on a 5% significant level. 
 
The data output shows that microfinance institutions located in a rural area will 
negatively influence the operating costs per assets of that institution, suggesting that 
financing in rural areas is in fact cost-efficient. Consequently, the results of our 
regression contradict our expectations of a positive relationship. This result may be 
explained by Wydick (1999)’s findings that compared to urban groups, the rural 
groups are more willing to apply social pressure to ensure repayment. Further research 
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is however needed in order to confirm or reject this assertion. Other explanations may 
be that monitoring costs are lower in rural areas, as unconventional methods often are 
used here (less bureaucracy), or that members of rural communities take pride in being 
able to handle their finances and business opportunities. Further research is suggested 
to draw any conclusion about the reasons for the negative relationship between 
outreach to rural areas and the operating costs rate in microfinance institutions. The 
variable can be shown to be significant at very low significant levels. 
 
The dummy variable DM_individ controls for the lending methodology of the 
microfinance institutions, and whether or not this will impact the operating costs of the 
microfinance institution. The relationship is shown to be positive, suggesting that as 
the level of loans to individuals increases, the operating costs will also increase.  
Accordingly, our regression supports the arguments that the benefit that comes with 
group lending leads to reduced costs. At a 10% significant level the effect on the 
dependent variable is however not significant.  
 
 
Variable Significant at a 10% level Effect on dependent variable 
Independent variables   
lnpar30 Significant Negative 
lnpar30_sqrt Significant Negative 
Control variables   
Loan size Significant Negative 
MFI size Significant Negative 
MFI age Not significant Positive 
Inflation Significant Positive 
Market orientation Significant Negative 
Loan methodology Not significant Positive 
 
Table 6.4 Overview of variables, their significance and effect on dependent variable 
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6.3 Endogeneity 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the level of default on loans the 
microfinance institutions undertake will have an impact on the operating costs 
measured by operating costs per assets, and whether the relationship between these to 
variables exists in that order. As discussed in chapter 4, theory provides reason to 
believe that the independent variable, lnpar30, is endogenous. 
 
The employment of instrumental variables is a widely used strategy when dealing with 
endogeneity (Bound, Jaeger & Baker, 1995). The instrument variable should not be 
directly associated with the outcome and should thus have a low correlation with the 
dependent variable and high correlation with the independent variable, which is 
suspected to be endogenous (Bound et al., 1995).  For this study lagged variables of 
the default on loans rate will be used as instrument variables to control for 
endogeneity. It is reasonable to expect that microfinance institutions with high levels 
of default one year also had somewhat high levels in previous or following years, as 
changes in the practice concerning collection and repayment are typically 
implemented over time. At the same time, last years- or the year before that- levels of 
default are not suspected to be directly correlated to this year’s operating costs.  
 
6.3.1. Test for endogeneity 
When conducting instrumental variables regressions it is interesting to perform a test 
of endogeneity to investigate whether or not the explanatory variable in fact is 
endogenous. This test, as well as the following tests for weak instruments and 
overidentification can only be run on the basis of a 2SLS instrumental variable 
regression, i.e. before we adjust for fixed or random effects. Thus, the results for the 
2SLS IV-regression is displayed below: 
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Figure 6.15 Results of 2SLS IV-regression 
 
Based on these results the test for endogeneity can be conducted. If the variable is 
endogenous it means that there is a reversed causality between the level of default and 
the operating costs rate in microfinance institutions. The null hypothesis is the 
independent variable (lnpar30) is exogenous. If the P-values for the Durbin (score) 
statistics and the Wu-Hausman statistics are low, the null hypothesis can be rejected, 
i.e. the explanatory variables are endogenous. The results of the test for endogeneity 
are reported in figure 6.16 below: 
 
 
Figure 6.16 Results of test for endogeneity 
 
Here we see that both the P-values are above both the 5% and 10% significant level, 
meaning that we cannot reject the hypothesis that lnpar30 is exogenous.  The 
implications this cause for the study is that we are torn between the theoretical 
arguments of endogeneity and the results of the test displaying that it will likely not be 
an issue in our model. Because the theoretical evidence (see Berger & De Young, 
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1997) tell us that the default on loans rate should be treated as an endogenous variable, 
we will go a head with the additional test related to endogeneity despite the results of 
the endogeneity test.  
 
6.3.2 Test for weak instruments 
This test is conducted to control whether the instruments chosen are good for the 
model. When testing for weak instruments we are interested in the correlation between 
the instruments and the (suspected) endogenous variables. Here we look at the partial 
R
2
, which measures the correlation between the default on loans (lnpar30) and the 
lagged variables of the default on loans when we have eliminated the effect of the 
exogenous variables (the control variables). This correlation should be high. The other 
thing we are interested in is our F-statistic. Here the null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are weak. If the p-value is low it means that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected and that the instruments are not weak.   
 
 
Figure 6.17 Results of test for weak instruments 
 
The results show a partial R
2
 of 0.2067, which is not high, but it is very low either. 
The p-value (Prob>F) is shown to be 0.0000, which means that the null hypothesis can 
be rejected: the instruments used are not weak and can be considered good for the 
model.  
 
6.3.3 Test for overidentification 
This test is carried out to control the number of instruments compared to the number 
of endogenous variables to see if the model is correctly specified. What we want to see 
is overidentification, which means that the number of instruments is greater than the 
number of endogenous variables. Justified identification, where the number of 
instruments equals the number of endogenous variables, is also acceptable. What we 
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want to avoid is underidentification, where there are less instrumental variables than 
endogenous variables.  
 
In the test, the null hypothesis is that the instrument set is valid and the model is 
correctly specified. We are again interested in the p-value, which should be high to 
confirm that the model is correctly specified. If the levels are lower than 0.05, the null 
hypothesis has to be rejected and the model cannot be said to be correctly specified.  
 
 
Figure 6.18 Results of test for overidentification  
 
The results of our test of overidentification show a high p-value of 0.3873, indicating 
that the model is correctly specified.  
 
6.3.4 Results of IV-regression using random effects 
The model displayed in figure 6.19 below is carried out using random effects, as 
supported by the Hausman test conducted in chapter 6.2. Because of the results of the 
endogeneity test in chapter 6.3.1 we chose to display the results ignoring the 
instrumental variables and treating all variables as exogenous. The instrumental 
variables regression (IV-regression) show that the default rate on loans still 
significantly influences the operating costs rate, both in terms of the default on loans 
rate and the squared function of it. By utilizing instrument variables regression, we are 
able to hold the explanatory variable (lnpar30 and lnpar30_sqrt) virtually exogenous 
and not endogenous. Any problems concerning endogeneity can thus be considered to 
be relieved.   
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Figure 6.19 Results from G2SLS random-effects IV regression 
 
The concave bivariate relationship between the independent and dependent variables 
(as shown in figure 6.11) tell us that operating costs increase with default on loans 
initially, but after a point the operating costs will decrease with increasing defaults. 
This suggests an initial positive effect and a subsequent negative effect of the 
independent variable. An explanation for this is that when default rates are increasing 
initially, operating costs will also increase, as more resources are committed to reduce 
the defaults. Over time the microfinance institutions might become more cost-efficient 
even though default rates continue to increase. Another alternative is that fixed 
investments were incurred and that they over time have started providing benefits for 
the institution. However, the concave curve graphed in the predictive margins is not 
supported by the multivariate regression results in figure 6.19 because both the linear 
and squared term of the independent variable has a negative coefficient. In order to 
conclude that the relationship between default on loans and operating costs is non-
linear we wish to see opposite signs of the linear and squared term of the default on 
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loans, and that they both are significant. The concave graph displayed in the predictive 
margins merely illustrates the bivariate relationship between the two variables. A 
bivariate analysis is one of the simplest forms of quantitative analysis and is used to 
determine the empirical relationship between two variables.  
 
Once we include a square term in the regression using with robust standard errors and 
the results give the same coefficient signs and statistical insignificance, the squared 
term can be disregarded. The results of the instrumental variable regression show that 
there is a negative relationship between the default on loans rate (lnpar30) and the 
operating costs rate, suggesting that as risk increases, operating costs will decrease. 
This finding support Berger and De Youngs (1997) assertion that banks incur 
additional costs from trying to maintain low levels of default, as it forces the bank to 
spend extra resources on monitoring and underwriting to influence loan quality. The 
results suggest that microfinance institutions might gain from looking into making 
some adjustments to lower the monitoring and supervisory costs that are incurred from 
maintaining low rates of loan default. Further studies are however recommended to get 
a clearer picture of the functional form of the relationship, as the multivariate 
regression in this analysis does not support the findings in the bivariate analysis.  
 
 
6.4 Reliability and validity 
 
The reliability and validity of a study is concerned the quality of the work. The 
reliability refers to whether the data can be considered trustworthy/reliable, while the 
validity is concerned with its relevance to the associated theory and the research 
objective (Ringdal, 2013). 
 
6.4.1 Reliability 
The reliability of the data will be improved if it is possible to achieve similar results in 
repeated measurements using the same measurement concepts (Ringdal, 2013). This 
can be tested for by conducting additional regressions using the same control 
variables, but altering the variables used to measure the concepts of the dependent and 
independent variable.  
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Alternative measures 
For this study we will use the operating expenses related to portfolio as an alternative 
measure for the operating cost rate and conduct the same regressions and tests as with 
the operating expenses related to assets. The alternate variable will be replacing the 
initial variable in such a way that we get results for the relationship between Par30 and 
operating expenses related to assets as well as Par30 and operating expenses related to 
portfolio. As an alternative to the independent variable this study will use the 
combined credit risk. This variable is a combination of the write off and par30 in the 
microfinance institutions, and is thus a suitable measure for the risk of default. 
Regressions will be run using both operating expenses related to assets and operating 
expenses related to portfolio as the dependent variable and the combined credit risk as 
the independent variable. Consequently, we attain results from four different 
combinations of variables, as illustrated in the matrix below. If the alternative analyses 
show similar results to those presented in the previous chapters, the reliability of the 
study and the results are strengthened. The control variables will remain the same in 
all regressions.  
 
 lnpar30 lncomb_credrisk 
lnoperexp_assets Quadric bivariate 
relationship 
 
Negatively correlated 
 
Significant at a 5% 
significant level 
Quadric bivariate 
relationship 
 
Negatively correlated 
 
Insignificant at a 5% 
significant level 
lnoperexp_portf Quadric bivariate 
relationship 
 
Negatively correlated 
 
Insignificant at 5% and 
10% significant level 
Quadric bivariate 
relationship 
 
Negatively correlated 
 
Insignificant at 5% and 
10% significant level  
Table 6.5 Results with alternative measures 
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The table show that all models find a negative, quadric bivariate relationship between 
the default on loans and the operating costs rate. The full regressions using alternative 
measures can be found in appendix 3. We do however note that the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variable is shown to be insignificant when 
using alternative measures. This strengthens the need for further studies on the 
relationship between the default on loans rate and operating costs rate in microfinance 
institutions. On the other hand, the results using alternative measure are consistent and 
have the same signs on the coefficients in all regressions. Additionally, they all have 
the same shape of the bivariate relationship between the dependent and independent 
variable as we see the initial analysis using par30 and operating expenses related to 
assets. 
 
6.4.2 Validity 
The validity of the study cover the entire experimental concept and is concerned with 
whether or not it measures what we intended to measure and to what degree you can 
draw conclusions about the research objective (Braut, 2009). Additionally, it 
ascertains whether the requirements of scientific research method is met. It is common 
to talk about both internal and external validity, which respectively concerns the 
degree to which the experimental design is structured correctly and the variables 
measure the concept it was meant to (Ringdal, 2013), as well as the process of 
examining the results and possible causal relationships. In terms of the internal 
validity it is essential to point out that the purpose of this study was to investigate the 
relationship between the default on loans rate and the operating costs rate in the 
microfinance institutions, and that it does not aim to explain, nor explore, the drivers 
behind the operating costs rate. The control variables in the study are thus included to 
control that the calculated effect of risk on the operating costs rate in fact stems from 
that risk variable and not other factors. The regression models portrait the effects of 
the control variables as well as the independent variable, and the calculated 
significance of these variables tells us that us that we were correct in including them in 
the model, as theory suggested. We do however note that the microfinance age and 
lending methodology did not prove significant, and could thus be left out of the model. 
On the other hand, there is plenty of theory suggesting that these variables do affect 
the operating costs of the microfinance institutions. For this reason the variables 
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remained in the model, but we suggest further research as to whether or not they 
actually affect the dependent variable.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
Drawing from contract and agency theory, theory on moral hazard, credit risk and 
Berger & De Youngs (1997) study on cost efficiency, this thesis have argued that there 
is reason to believe that default rates in microfinance institutions can both positively 
and negatively affect the operating costs of the institutions. This is argued by 
discussing how; (i) the effects of utility-maximizing behaviour and that these can be 
extra prominent in the microfinance industry because the clients often are poor and 
desperate, (ii) social monitoring procedures of the microfinance industry can actually 
lower the need for monitoring and controlling measures by the institution itself, (iii) 
the microfinance institutions incur increased monitoring due to clients lacking credit 
history and collateral,  (iv) moral hazard and information asymmetry leads to evasion 
of the first-best solution, (v) the microfinance industry has challenges with monitoring 
due to problems separating good from bad risk, (vi) microfinance institutions can 
experience difficulties implementing and sustaining credit risk management, (vii) low 
levels of default also lowers operating costs, as defaults have been shown to leave 
banks with fewer resources available to for lending to other customers, (iix) banks 
incur additional costs from loans that do not perform or default because they force the 
microfinance institution to spend extra resources on monitoring and underwriting to 
influence loan quality, and (ix) bad management in terms of monitoring and 
underwriting (i.e. bad credit risk management) will lead to increased operating costs 
almost immediately, whereas loan defaults typically occur at a later point in time. 
Existing theory and research makes good arguments for both a positive influence of 
the default rate on the operating cost rate, as well as a negative influence. These 
arguments set the basis for investigating the actual relationship between the two 
variables and whether or not the default on loans rate can actually affect the operating 
costs both positively and negatively (i.e. a non-linear relationship).  The results of this 
study show that there is a bivariate quadric relationship between default on loans and 
operating costs, but this is not supported in the multivariate regression as both lnpar30 
and lnpar30_sqrt have a negative coefficient. The consequence of this is that we 
cannot conclude that the relationship between default on loans and operating costs is 
non-linear, and we do not succeed in illustrating a general functional form for the 
relationship. Further studies are suggested on this topic as the bivariate results 
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suggests that there might in fact be a non-linear relationship. Also, the study faces 
some limitations in that the model does not control for the measures microfinance 
institutions take once they notice that the default on loans is higher than wanted. As 
argued in previous chapters, many banks incur additional costs from loans that do not 
perform or default because they feel forced to spend extra resources on monitoring and 
underwriting to influence loan quality. However, the interesting question regarding the 
relationship between default on loans and operating costs is how the operating costs 
would look if the microfinance institution did not try to compensate for the higher 
default levels by applying more resources in collection and monitoring practice, but in 
stead settled for a higher level of default. Would they be better off by allowing for 
higher default levels and consequently, lower costs on monitoring, control and 
collection practice?  
 
 
7.1 Suggestions for future studies 
 
Studies controlling for the microfinance response to higher default rates is suggested 
to improve the quality of the relationship between the default on loans rate and 
operating costs rate in microfinance institutions. It would be interesting to see how 
these two variables influence each other when the institutions willingly allow for 
higher default levels than what has become common in the industry.  
 
This study uses alternative measures of both the dependent and independent variable 
to check the reliability of the results. Though the results are similar with different 
variables, they are not significant. I recommend that additional studies using different 
measurements for default on loans and operating costs are conducted in order to gain a 
better understanding and more reliable conclusions on the relationship between these 
two variables.  
 
Our regression analysis shows that there is a negative effect of a rural market 
orientation and the operating costs in microfinance institutions. This is not aligned 
with the theoretical expectations. Because there is limited studies conducted on this 
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subject, it would be interesting to investigate the effect of the market orientation on 
operating costs further. 
 
Generally, any study that explains or explores one or more drivers behind the 
operating costs rate would be interesting and beneficial in the microfinance sector. As 
argued in the initial chapters, the industry faces a need for lower operating costs in 
order to lower the interest rates offered to customers.  
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Appendix 1: Distribution tests 
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Appendix 2: Regressions using alternative measures 
 
Dependent variable: operating expenses related to portfolio 
Independent variable: par30 
 
Preliminary regression with robust standard errors 
 
 
Prediction of bivariate relationship between par30 and operating expenses related to portfolio 
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Regression including quadric term for dependent variable 
 
 
Predictive margins 
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Results from fixed-effects regression 
 
 
 
Results from random-effects regression 
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Results from Hausman test 
 
Results from IV-regression, fixed effects 
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Dependent variable: operating expenses related to assets 
Independent variable: combined credit risk 
 
 
Preliminary regression with robust standard errors 
 
 
 
Prediction of bivariate relationship between the combined credit risk and operating expenses related to 
assets 
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Note: Regressions and predictive margins below are run using both the quadric and qubic term of the 
independent variable, as the prediction of the bivariate relationship show a qubic function. Results on 
predictive margins show a quadric function, which is used in following tests. 
 
 
 
Regression including quadric term for dependent variable 
 
 
 
Predictive margins 
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Regression including qubic term for dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictive margins 
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Results from fixed-effects regression 
 
 
 
Results from random-effects regression 
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Results from Hausman test 
 
 
Results from IV-regression, fixed effects 
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Dependent variable: operating expenses related to portfolio 
Independent variable: combined credit risk 
 
 
Preliminary regression with robust standard errors 
 
 
Prediction of bivariate relationship between the combined credit risk and operating expenses related to 
portfolio 
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Regression including quadric term for dependent variable 
 
 
Predictive margins 
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Results from fixed-effects regression 
 
 
 
Results from random-effects regression 
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Results from Hausman test 
 
 
Results from IV-regression, fixed effects 
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Appendix 3: Independence of error terms (autocorrelation) 
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Appendix 4: Fixed and Random effects 
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Appendix 5: Reflection note 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This reflective note will shortly present the main theme and findings of the thesis, and 
then continue by identifying how the thesis topic relates to broader international 
trends, innovation and responsibility. 
 
2.0 Summary of thesis findings 
This thesis is based on contract and agency theory, theory on moral hazard, credit risk 
and Berger & De Youngs (1997) study on cost efficiency. It argues that there is reason 
to believe that the level of default on loans in microfinance institutions can both 
positively and negatively affect the operating costs of the institutions. Existing theory 
and research makes good arguments for both a positive and negative influence of the 
default level on operating costs. These arguments set the basis for investigating the 
actual relationship between the two variables. The results of the study show that there 
is a bivariate quadric relationship between default on loans and operating costs, but 
this is not supported in the multivariate regression analysis. The consequence of this is 
that we cannot conclude that the relationship between default on loans and operating 
costs is non-linear, and we do not succeed in illustrating a general functional form for 
the relationship. That means that we cannot find any patterns that indicate that a 
certain level of default will leave the institutions with the ability to minimize operating 
costs. Further studies are suggested on this topic as the bivariate results suggests that 
there might in fact be a non-linear relationship, and theory suggests that operating 
costs, and ultimately lending rates, can be reduced if default rates are optimised.  
 
3.0 Internationalization  
Microfinance institutions and other charitable organisations are in many cases reliant 
on donations in order to carry out their work. These can be donations from 
governments, large corporations, donor organisations or individuals. The donations are 
often given across borders, and not only to charitable organisations, but also to 
developing countries. A global economy has been established as far as donations go. 
Although microfinance institutions to a larger degree have become self-sufficient, the 
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industry still depends upon these donations. This thesis argues that the industry face a 
need for lower operating costs in order to lower the interest rate they offer to their 
clients. But another interesting way of thought is that if microfinance institutions are 
able to lower their operating costs, they could potentially increase their earnings. The 
core goal of microfinance institutions is to offer financing to the poor, but another 
important part of the industry is to do so in a financially sustainable way. Arguably, 
microfinance institutions will want to lower their interest rates when operating costs 
decrease, but perhaps they can split the savings from lower operating cost into 
covering reduced earnings as a result of lower interest charged as well as taking some 
(more) profit? The idea is that if the institutions are financially sustainable they will be 
less dependent on donations and become more self-sufficient. The institutions that are 
able to achieve good profits would perhaps even be able to attract investors, rather 
than donors. The upside from bringing in investors is that the institutions to a larger 
degree will be forced to put extra thought into how to achieve efficient and effective 
operations. Surely, many microfinance institutions have a strong focus on this already, 
but it is reasonable to assume that some rest comfortably on the fact that they are 
receiving funding through donations even if operations are not great. Another positive 
effect of attracting investors is that the chances are that they will be able to offer more 
funding than the microfinance institutions can achieve through donations. These extra 
resources can be used for research and development or other measures that would 
further improve efficiency. Microfinance institutions could possibly end up finding 
themselves in a blooming circle of opportunities by taking measures to reduce 
operating costs. Furthermore, the industry is today facing an increasing demand for 
international funding as many of the countries the microfinance institutions operate in 
are developing countries with poor or no possibility to offer donations or support to 
the institutions. In such a global economy, the competition between the microfinance 
institutions, charitable organisations and developing countries for donation is great and 
increasing. It is rational to assume that the competition will further increase in the 
coming years, as the microfinance industry still experience great growth. The more 
institutions, the harder the competition. In order to “win” funding by donors the 
institutions will have to distinguish themselves from other organisations. A great way 
to do so is by lowering their operating costs. International donors and investors are 
likely to be more concerned with financial sustainability than the loacals, as they often 
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come from well-developed countries and economies and are used to being able to set 
certain expectations for their investments/donations. They will want to put their money 
into well-driven and functioning organisations that are achieving their social goal of 
outreach as well as being financial sustainability. The way I see it, microfinance 
institutions can only win on lowering their operating costs. That be if they do it to 
increase outreach, profitability or sustainability. This is especially true when they 
operate and compete in an international economy. As concluded in this thesis, further 
research is needed to determine the relationship between the default on loans and 
operating costs in microfinance institutions, but I do believe that there is potential for 
lowering operating costs by investigating this relationship further. Additional drivers 
of the operating costs should be explored, in order for the microfinance industry to 
continue to thrive in the global economy that includes countries all over the world. 
 
 
4.0 Innovation 
As explained in this thesis, microfinance institutions serve a social mission of outreach 
to the poor. This counts for short of half of the world’s population. Evidently, 
microfinance institutions carry great responsibilities in the work they do, and the 
outreach is very important in order to help more people. To my knowledge, no 
previous studies have been conducted on the effect of default on loans on operating 
costs in microfinance institutions. There have been studies on this in commercial 
banks, but for some reason no one has looked into the microfinance industry. Because 
the industry over time has become so concerned with lowering risk, the default rates 
are very low. This is of course not for free. Microfinance institutions spend great 
resources on monitoring and collection practice, which in turn drives up the operating 
costs. This thesis investigates whether it is possible to lower operating costs by 
allowing for more default, but the results are inconclusive. However, the goal is to 
reduce operating costs, not to increase default. What if it is possible to let the low 
default levels remain, but still reduce the amount of resources spent on monitoring, 
control and collection of repayment? One possible way to deal with this challenge is to 
embrace technology. We have seen great innovation in commercial banking through 
the use of technology, and would expect to see the same positive effects in the 
microfinance industry. There is great potential when it comes to technology, and by 
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the use of innovation the microfinance industry could possibly close the gap that has 
emerged in this respect. The microfinance industry is far behind the commercial 
banking industry when it comes to technology and need to address this deviation. The 
challenge is of course that in many of the poorest areas the customers do not have 
access to power, let alone Internet. The microfinance institutions would need to find 
innovative ways to reach out to customers with their technology. One way to do so is 
to set up Internet stations in public areas (much like ATMs) where clients can go to 
register information, send loan applications, check their debt, etc. This should be 
connected to a regular ATM and deposit machine in areas where cash is commonly 
used, so that the clients can also make repayments or receive their loans via the station. 
Another way to innovate the industry is to implement technological solutions where 
possible, e.g. in urban and semi-rural areas. Wherever the microfinance institutions 
can reduce the use of resources is a step in the right direction, as they can allocate the 
resources elsewhere. A segmentation of the market into geographical areas is thus one 
way to innovate the lending and collection process. 
 
5.0 Responsibility 
Over the past decade the microfinance industry has received criticism for having too 
harsh collection practise and for neglecting their social mission to serve the poor. 
Critics argue that the microfinance institutions are exploiting the poor by demanding 
such high interest rates. As stated in the introduction of this thesis, it is a paradox that 
the poorest people pay the highest interest rates. Microfinance institutions face an 
ethical responsibility when it comes to the quality of the services they provide. Though 
microfinance institutions operate as banks, they are in fact based on a charity concept. 
The issue of responsibility recur throughout this thesis by pointing out the need for 
lower operating costs in order to provide lower interest rates to the microfinance 
clients. Contrary to assertions by critics, research show that microfinance institutions 
are not being greedy, but that the interest rates offered to the customers are mainly 
comprised of operating costs, cost of loans and loan loss. High costs and low margins 
have been pointed out as the main problem of the industry. This thesis encounters the 
question of responsibility in the microfinance industry by looking into a possible way 
for the institutions to offer lower interest to their customers. In the future I hope to see 
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that microfinance institutions do not only offer banking to the poor, but that they do so 
at the same terms as are offered by commercial banks to better-off customers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
